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Abstract: This article explores a more expansive adjudicative role for domestic judiciaries in the
U.S., U.K., and Canada in private law disputes that concern personal and environmental harm by
multinational corporations that operate in the Global South. This expansive role may confront—
although not necessarily upend—existing understandings around the separation of powers in
common law jurisdictions. I canvass existing literature on judicial activism. Then, I detail legality
gaps in the selected common law home states, which can be broken down into four categories: i)
failed legislation; ii) deficient legislation; iii) judicial restraint; and iv) judicial deference.
I suggest three ways to actualize judicial activism in transnational business and human rights
litigation. First, judges can heed Thomas Franck’s recognition that there is a distinction between
judicial and foreign policy. That distinction becomes rather acute here since transnational business
and human rights litigation does not directly involve governments as parties to the litigation.
Second, judges can prioritize the need to fill transnational access to justice gaps. I examine two
potential ways that judicial gap-filling can take place: expanding the list of violations deemed as
part of the Alien Tort Statute’s ‘law of nations’ requirement and a better alignment of the ex ante
/ ex post flip in instances of FNC dismissals and foreign judgment enforcement. Third,
transnational business and human rights litigation may be an apt area to employ judicial morality
in deciding ‘hard cases.’ Judges can utilize a natural law framework that prioritizes corporate
accountability over formalistic doctrinal conceptions.
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Introduction
Recent trends in the courts and legislatures of common law “home state” jurisdictions where
western multinational corporations (MNCs) are headquartered portend a crystallizing path if
victims of corporate-related human rights and environmental abuses in Global South “host states”
are going to have viable avenues to recover compensatory tort remedies through home state legal
systems.1 In the past few decades, home state legislatures in nearly all western common law home
states have refused to pass statutes that include provisions around the private law liability of MNCs
for personal and environmental harms abroad. As such, existing statutory frameworks in common
law home states—the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.) and Canada being the focus
here—do not provide a means for home state courts to systemically impute private law liability
upon MNCs for harm they allegedly commit against Global South workers and third party
community members. In addition, home state judiciaries have tended to take restrained or
deferential approaches. As a result, corporate revenues that could be used as a means to
compensate harmed Global South victims have been sheltered by domestic home state laws.
Scholars have memorialized the above scenario as part of a “governance gap” or a “missing forum”
to suggest a number of solutions that, in one way or another, expect leadership from the political
branches of government.2 This circular reasoning places faith in the very institutions that have
consistently shirked their responsibilities to create systemic avenues for Global South host state
victims to seek redress from MNCs that commit egregious violations in the course of transnational
commerce. What has received relatively less attention in this literature is the role that domestic
judiciaries could, in theory, play in the midst of existing legislative gaps and a previous policy of
judicial restraint and deference. Distinct from the political branches of government that require a
level of consensus to pass legislation, judiciaries are able to reverse past adjudicative approaches
relatively easily in a way that could result in the more consistent transfer of corporate revenues to
Global South host state victims pursuant to host state human rights and environmental violations.
Previous scholarship from the common law world has assessed the place of domestic judiciaries
vis-à-vis the political branches of government in light of constitutional constraints or established
practices as they relate to foreign affairs with other nations. It is problematic to transpose that
discourse into the realm of transnational business and human rights litigation. Whereas
constitutional or foreign relations concerns often involve interactions that state governments have
with actors abroad, the potential domestic law liability of MNCs in transnational scenarios is one
degree removed from prevailing understandings of foreign affairs. MNCs function within
“disembedded markets” and are not legally connected to governments in the territories where they

Sara Seck, “Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities: Global, Legal and Management Perspectives” in
CORPORATE SOCIAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES: GLOBAL, LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES, 29
(K. Buhmann, L. Roseberry, & M. Morsing eds., 2010) (host state as "where the impact of the human rights violations
is felt.").
2
PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE (2014); MAYA STEINITZ, THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL JUSTICE
(2018).
1
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are headquartered.3 Although they may originate out of general incorporation statutes passed by
legislatures, MNCs are not per se the state or agents thereof. This reality is unmitigated by the fact
that many of the largest MNCs that operate in host states in the Global South (predominantly in
extractive and manufacturing industries) retain close economic and political ties with those states’
governments.
In light of prevailing legislative and judicial gaps in western home states where transnational
business and human rights litigation is often commenced, detailed below, I argue for a more
expansive adjudicative role for domestic judiciaries in disputes that concern personal and
environmental harm in the Global South. This expansive role may confront—although not
necessarily upend—existing understandings around the separation of powers, particularly in
common law jurisdictions. Even so, it prioritizes the necessity of affording private law remedies
to those who have experienced violations of their personal dignity and security and serves as a
method to fill transnational access to justice gaps. Judicial lawmaking in this area can, in turn,
effect corporate accountability with the prospect of curtailing MNC behaviour in the Global South
in the future.
To advocate for a more expansive role of domestic common law home state courts that are
increasingly called upon to adjudicate transnational business and human rights litigation pursuant
to personal or environmental harms in the Global South, I canvass existing literature on judicial
activism and then suggest ways that it can appropriately be expressed in an area of litigation where
there continue to be gaps in legality. More activist judiciaries can prioritize the need to afford
Global South host state victims viable paths to compensatory redress where very few, if any,
currently exist.
Part I of this article presents some literature on judicial activism from both its proponents and
opponents. I outline how the concept has been understood when it comes to both domestic and
transnational disputes. Part II outlines existing legislative and judicial gaps when it comes to
transnational business and human rights litigation. Although there have been failures and
deficiencies in other home states, I focus particularly on the U.S., U.K., and Canadian legal systems
where a large proportion of transnational business and human rights litigation has been
commenced.
Part III suggests three methods by which judicial activism can be actualized in common law home
state courts in transnational business and human rights litigation. First, judges can heed Franck’s
recognition that there is a distinction between judicial and foreign policy. That distinction becomes
rather acute in transnational business and human rights litigation since it does not specifically
include domestic or foreign governments as parties to the litigation. Second, judges can prioritize
the need to fill transnational access to justice gaps given the lack of remedial avenues open to
Global South host state victims. And third, this type of litigation may be a prime example of where
judicial morality plays an appropriate role in deciding ‘hard cases.’ Judges can utilize a natural
law framework that prioritizes accountability and remedies for international human rights
3

See generally Peer Zumbansen, Corporate governance, capital market regulation and the challenge of disembedded
markets in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, (William
Sun, Jim Stewart, & David Pollard eds., 2012).
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violations over formalistic doctrinal conceptions, reviewed in Part II(c) and (d), that have hindered
corporate accountability in the past.
Before proceeding, two clarifications are required. First, although the need for expansive
adjudication can be argued for a number of western home states in common and civil law countries
(including Germany and the Netherlands for the latter) where transnational business and human
rights litigation has been commenced, I focus predominantly here on the common law world as, to
date, the vast majority of transnational corporate liability claims, largely couched in tort law
principles, have been commenced in those jurisdictions. At times though, I do mention particular
cases and legislation in civil law jurisdictions.
Second, the transnational judicialization I discuss here is distinct from concepts of judicial
globalization or global judicial dialogue put forth by Anne-Marie Slaughter and others. In that
discourse, judges at the national, supranational, and/or international level are in a position to
communicate with one another through their judicial decisions in order to elicit a shared notion of
human rights or other fundamental concepts that transcend state boundaries. Here, the expansive
transnational judicial role in light of legislative gaps recognizes that Global South host state
plaintiffs are to be afforded private law cause of action and a viable pathway to compensatory
remedies when their own judicial systems are incapable or unwilling to do the same.

I.

Academic Conceptions of Judicial Activism

As Keenan Kmiec noted in his 2004 article The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism,
as a concept judicial activism is often used by judges and academics without a presentation of what
it actually means. In his article, Kmiec construed the concept of judicial activism as having five
‘core meanings’ or, in other words, five instances in which we can say that a judge has exhibited
activism. These instances are when i) the political branches of government have taken arguably
constitutional actions that are then nullified or overturned by courts; ii) courts fail to adhere to their
own precedent or that of higher courts; iii) courts legislate from the bench; iv) courts employ novel
interpretations of past laws; and v) courts make law with the results in mind (result-oriented
judging). In a similar vein, Sterling Harwood interprets judges as being activist when they refuse
to defer to the other branches of government, relax requirements around justiciability (i.e. take an
expansive view of jurisdiction), break with precedent, and loosely or creatively interpret
constitutions, statutes, or judicial precedents.4
From these definitions and characterizations, judicial activism as a concept is intricately connected
to the separations of power. The above authors, in understanding the term, were concerned with
the extent to which judicial power seeps into the normative purviews of the legislative and
executive branches of government.5 That concern alone makes judicial activism relevant in
4

Also see Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 236–247 (1982) (six
dimensions of judicial activism).
5
Judicial activism is distinct from judicial discretion, which is about the ability for judges to make more than one right
choice. See Kent Greenwalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Question for the Fetters that Bind Judges,
Legislation, 43 Harv L. Rev. 1302; Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Colum L. Rev. 379 (1907).
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transnational disputes because it is the executive branch, which either through constitutional decree
(as in the U.S.) or by the practice of Crown prerogative (as in Canada and the U.K.), tasked with
building relations with other nations’ governments. Separation of powers concerns are likewise
present in transnational business and human rights litigation. MNCs often contract with or align
closely with host state governments and/or their militaries throughout the course of manufacturing
and extractive activities and increasingly public works projects around infrastructure and
transportation. Those public-private interactions can and, in fact, do have profound influences on
foreign relations.
Judicial activism is often viewed in contradistinction to judicial restraint—whether it be to the
legislative process or the executive’s ability to engage in foreign relations. However, Edward
McWhinney, in the second of his two seminal articles on the topic concerning the U.S. Supreme
Court, argued that rather than dichotomous classifications, these two categories are better viewed
as “different points on a continuum.”6 McWhinney surmised a judge’s decision to exhibit activism
or restraint to be contingent on questions of timing and technique. He asks, “[a]re there particular
time periods appropriate for the exercise of strict (restrictive) judicial interpretation of a
constitution or statute, and other periods in which more ample conceptions of the judicial office
are desirable or necessary?”7 He asserts that the initial periods after a statute is passed warrant a
more restrictive interpretation.
As for technique, McWhinney takes the views that the level of judicial activism (which he relegates
to expansive statutory interpretations8) depends largely on a nation’s constitutional structure. A
“simple and unitary” constitution that places significant power in the legislative and executive
branches, in his view, requires little, if any, judicial activism. On the contrary, a “complex
constitutional structure”, in McWhinney’s words, based on a separation of powers and “amending
machinery which works only with extreme difficulty and slowness” necessitates a greater
responsibility—and even a primary one—of constitutional and statutory interpretation to the
judiciary. For the judicial role in statutory interpretation, he takes the example of the U.S. with its
bouts of war and recurring and evolving issues of race relations. Conceivably, with the complexity
of American society and in light of its constitutional structure marked by checks and balances,
McWhinney surmises that courts ought to establish a list of priorities that dictate when (and to
what extent) they will exhibit activist tendencies.9
Finally, while most authors have approached the topic of judicial activism in relation to domestic
disputes, little has been written on the concept in relation to transnational and international
disputes. In his 2012 study, Fuad Zarbiyev proposed a conceptual framework for judicial activism
in international law. Perhaps in line with the ambiguity with which some international legal
scholars write, Zarbiyev views judicial activism as dependent on prevailing social conventions. He

6

Edward McWhinney, The Great Debate: Activism and Self-Restraint and Current Dilemmas in Judicial PolicyMaking, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 775, 790 (1958).
7
Id. at 791.
8
For this type of approach to judicial activism, also see Wallace Mendelson, The Politics of Judicial Activism, 24
EMORY L. J. 43–66 (1975).
9
McWhinney, supra note 6, at 792–793.
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comes upon a number of variables to determine whether activism for judges who interpret
international legal mechanisms is justified. These factors are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the conception of the judicial function (are judges pursuing ‘a grand design’?),
the degree of determinacy in the system (how is law defined and interpreted?),
the existence of a hierarchically structured judicial system (is there an appeals structure?),
prudential doctrines (are there times where judges should not interfere with political
branches?),
the mechanisms of political control (are there exit routes from judicial decisions?)
the legitimating function of legal academics (are singular judicial decisions viewed more
broadly in light of neutral principles?)
the nature of proceedings (ad hoc, advisory, or permanent tribunals)
discursive constraints (what, if any, disciplinary rules must judges adhere to?)
social legitimacy considerations (do judges have to justify their decisions to the wider
public?)

As may be gleaned from Zarbiyev’s above-noted variables, there is a range of possibilities as to
whether and how a particular judiciary will be activist, as he views the concept. However, in all,
given the large quantity of factors to which he attributes the potential for activism, it becomes
difficult to ascertain when activism is, in his view, properly employed within the confines of the
judicial role.
In the next two subsections, I review a spectrum of opinions on judicial activism, from more
progressive takes to more conservative ones. By and large, these two camps fall within what Hugh
Thirlway dichotomizes as formal versus substantive judicial activism. Formalists, much like
positivists in legal philosophy, discussed later, view the law as being complete with the provision
of an answer to every possible scenario (and, as such, no law when there is no answer). 10 From
this perspective, there is no room for judicial discretion. Therefore, when judges depart from the
accepted apparatus of the law, they are, in fact, acting ultra vires their powers.
On the other hand, substantivists, again like their counterparts in legal philosophy, accept that there
can be lacunae in existing laws. In light of that, judges can supplement those laws or even create
law by themselves without explicit authority from the other branches of government.11 Of course,
there are intermediary positions, such as H.L.A. Hart’s notion that judicial discretion is permissible
in areas of ‘penumbra’, where there remains ambiguity. However, Hart would rightfully be
classified as being closer to the formalists because, for him, the ‘heart of law’ leaves no room for
judicial discretion.12
As a point of caution, most, if not all, of the views presented below are from American authors or
those who have opined on judicial activism within the American legal system. However, their
analysis can be analogized to other common law systems, particularly the U.K. and Canada where
Cf RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE XX (1988) (a lacuna in the law may require an answer).
Hugh Thirlway, Judicial Activism and the International Court of Justice in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA
(2 VOLS), 75–76 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds., 2002).
12
H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 593, 614–615 (1958).
10
11
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transnational business and human rights litigation has also been commenced. The primary thrust
of the literature on judicial activism in the U.S.—again, comparable to other common law
systems—is the extent to which judges can weigh in on a dispute when it abuts the political
branches of their own governments or other governments around the world. Therefore, in a
Montesquian tripartite system, that discourse can rightfully be transplanted within the discourse of
other common law systems.
a. Some supportive views
The view that domestic judges, as arms-length actors largely insulated from political pressures
once in their posts, are the cornerstone of common law system is a long-held understanding. Brian
Bix notes that Blackstone favoured ‘judicial legislation as the strongest characteristic of the
common law.13
Kmiec, in the article noted above, traced the first modern usage of the term ‘judicial activism’ to
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. In a 1947 Fortune article, Schlesinger wrote that a wise judge “knows that
political choice is inevitable; he makes no false pretense of objectivity and consciously exercises
the judicial power with an eye to social results.”14 Despite his seeming approval of activist judges,
Schlesinger thought it best for judges to be activist only in cases that concern civil liberties. He
characterized the Black-Douglas ‘progressive’ wing of the U.S. Supreme Court, in effect, to have
adopted the posture that “the Court cannot escape politics: therefore, let it use its political power
for wholesome social purposes.”15 Seemingly, for Schlesinger, it would be a wholesome purpose
for judges to thwart precedent, legislate from the bench, or judge with the result in mind when it
comes to matter than affect people’s civil liberties. In contemporary terms, his stance would
arguably encompass transnational human rights violations by U.S.-domiciled MNCs.16
In his 1964 article, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, Richard Falk
took a partisan position that supported judicial lawmaking independent of the political branches.
He sought to push back against “[t]he paternalistic claim that the government can protect its
citizens better if they are denied a judicial remedy in an international law case.”17 He confronted
this parochial stance on judicial lawmaking as something that “undermines the effort to transform
the law of nations into a law of mankind.”18 Falk had begun to develop a participatory theory of
domestic courts in the international legal order in another article published three years prior. There,
he argued that deference on the part of domestic judiciaries to national policy in international

13

Brian Bix, Positively Positivism, 85 VA. L. REV. 889, 907 n.108 (1999) (book review), cited in Keenan D. Kmiec,
The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1441, 1444, n. 15 (2004)
[internal citations omitted].
14
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947
15
Id.
16
Despite his dissent in Lochner in which he promoted ‘judicial self-restraint’, Holmes, like Schlesinger, was
supportive of some degree of judicial activism when it came to cases around civil liberties. See Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
17
Richard A Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 39 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 429,
430 (1964).
18
Falk, id.
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affairs, in fact, results in less objective legal results.19 He did not see a conflict between domestic
courts being constituent institutions of specific states and simultaneously being agents of an
emerging international order.
For Falk, international disputes brought before domestic courts called for two types of autonomy:
institutional autonomy i.e. the separation of the judicial branch from the political branches of
government, and doctrinal autonomy i.e. the independence of the rules of international law from
the political sphere. Like Thomas Franck’s notion of judicial versus foreign policy, detailed below,
Falk viewed the executive and judicial branches as operating within two distinct spheres of interest.
Whereas the executive branch acts in the public interest with the goal of reaching settlements and
agreements among states around collective action problems (with indirect consequences to
individuals who have been affected in one way or another by such problems), the judicial branch
has a private interest in determining whether there has been a specific infringement of individual
rights.
Falk acknowledged that a judiciary interpreting international law in accordance with executive
will would mean there would be a single national voice in international law disputes. However, in
what he characterized as ‘non-criminal and non-primitive’ international law cases brought before
domestic courts, he devised ten reasons that support a rationale for judicial independence:
1- The absence or unavailability of international tribunals;
2- A loss of respect for international law as a legal system if it is subservient to diplomatic
processes and goals;
3- Domestic courts have an opportunity to advance international law rules;
4- The domesticity of the forum is not essential to the dispute
5- Judicial independent shatters the notion that sovereignty permits a state to reconcile its
national interests with its international law obligations
6- A general acceptance of judicial independence will lessen the burden (or surprise)
experienced by executive branches
7- Judicial independence preserves a private sphere of international transactions not succumb
to government control
8- The visibility of domestic courts makes the averse to political pressures
9- Via their opinions, domestic courts have an educational function to teach the public about
the rules of international law
10- Domestic judicial opinions can play a role in promoting global legal order
Specific to the U.S., Falk viewed judicial independence in foreign relations-adjacent matters to
suspend the Bernstein doctrine.20 He thought it best that domestic judges retain discretion on when
to opine on transnational disputes that abut foreign relations. Naturally, this opens the door to more
activist lawmaking on the part of judges, including in transnational business and human rights
19

Richard A. Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order: A
Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7 (1961).
20
Id. at 21. Also see Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frres, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947) (the
doctrine allows the executive branch to intercede in Act of State cases when adjudication would not impinge upon
foreign relations).
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litigation. For Falk, a proper use of judicial discretion would be determined by whether there was
legitimate or illegitimate diversity between the sovereigns at issue. I discuss this important point
below as it implicitly concerns an infusion of judicial morality in transnational disputes. To
foreshadow though, I see Falk’s distinction between legitimate and illegitimate diversity in two
legal systems as a method by which domestic courts can weaponize activism in transnational
business and human rights litigation.
Thomas Franck is another salient author who has advocated for a more expansive judicial role in
transnational disputes. His 1992 book Political Questions / Judicial Answers is dedicated to
addressing the fact that judicial restraint in the U.S. vis-à-vis the other branches of government in
cases that implicate foreign relations actually stems back to British common law doctrine from the
colonial period.21 He traces prudential doctrines around foreign relations all the way back to the a
British Crown Court’s decision in Nabob of Arcot, a case which concerned a treaty between the
Nabob and the East India Company.22 Franck wrote:
The tradition of [judicial] abdication has been built, bit by bit, on the straw foundations of
dicta imported from the British monarchial system, deployed in cases where it was
irrelevant to the matters being litigated, and thus was introduced into American law
essentially without benefit of genuine adversary process, let alone profound jurisprudential
reflection.23
Franck’s argument can be summarized when he states that “there are no valid reasons—
constitutional, prudential, technical, or policy-driven—for treating foreign-relations cases
differently than others.”24 For him, the only relevant criteria for courts to assert jurisdiction is a
“ripe dispute between parties with standing.”25 He takes pains to review all the decisions around
foreign relations in the earliest years of the U.S. Supreme Court. He outlines that when it has been
in the interests of the U.S. government’s political branches, they have actually intervened in private
litigation to ensure the judiciary would not abdicate its adjudicative role.26
Addressing Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury, one of the first decisions that began to construct
a political question doctrine in the U.S., he found that “no effort is made [in Marbury] to explain
why foreign affairs should be placed beyond the reach of judicial review.” 27 As Franck’s blocked
quote above pronounces, the political question doctrine and other similar deferential and prudential
doctrines that are now not infrequently employed in transnational business and human rights
litigation crept into U.S. case law through British precedents that were largely addressed in early

21

THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN
AFFAIRS? Ch. 1 (1992).
22
3 Bro. C. C. 292; 29 Eng. Rep. 544 (Ch. 1791).
23
FRANCK, supra note 21 at 21.
24
Id. at 7.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 6.
27
Id. at 4 [emphasis in original].
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U.S. Supreme Court cases in obiter rather than being doctrinal analyses necessary to resolve those
disputes.28
Franck suggests U.S. courts have implicitly made a Faustian Pact with the other branches of
government as they have widened their jurisdiction with regard to domestic matters in exchange
for restraint when it comes to transnational matters that abut foreign relations. 29 Like his
predecessors, Franck criticizes the notion professed by some lawyers and judges that “the nation
must operate with a single voice—by which they mean the president’s—and that only the
executive branch has the information and expert experience necessary to make informed choices
in matters crucial to national security.”30
He makes the crucial point—and one that applies to transnational business and human rights
litigation in common law home states: “[w]hen courts speak in cases and thereby incidentally
affect some aspect of foreign relations, they do not make foreign policy. They make judicial
policy.”31 By this, he means that there is a distinction between, on the one hand, the ongoing and
entrenched relationships of one government with one or more other governments around the world
and, on the other hand, how individual rights are interpreted in a specific dispute that crosses state
boundaries.
Finally, a lively debate took place in the 2006-2007 volumes of the Yale Law Journal about the
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,32 an administrative law case about principles around judicial reference for domestic disputes.
Pursuant to that decision, a logical question in the minds of some was whether there should be a
substantial degree of deference on the part of the U.S. federal judiciary when they are tasked with
adjudicating legal disputes that have foreign relations elements attached.
Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal (the latter ironically retained by the defendants in Doe v. Nestle,
discussed below, to argue against ATS jurisdiction) were not convinced that there should be
substantial deference to the executive in disputes touching on foreign relations.33 Rather, they saw
a swath of cases that operate within what they call the “executive-constraining zone”, being matters
related to international law i) that occupies supreme federal law within the U.S. (i.e. ratified treaties
such as the Geneva Conventions, ii) made at least in part outside the executive (i.e. Article II
treaties made with the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate); and iii) that conditions the exercise
of executive power.34 Pushing back on Posner and Sunstein’s view that the costs and benefits of
disputes that impinge on foreign relations are best dealt with by the executive, Jinks and Katyal
asserted that Chevronizing foreign relations would put too much power in the hands of the
executive and even invite lawbreaking authority when it comes to international law within the

Also see id. at 8. (referring to this phenomenon as “doctrinal cacophony”).
Id. at 10–20 for an elaboration on this Faustian Pact.
30
Id. at 5.
31
Id. [emphasis added].
32
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
33
Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 1230
(2007).
34
Id. at 1236–1245 [detailing the three categories].
28
29
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“executive-constraining zone.” To them, Chevronizing foreign relations—while it may bolster
foreign relations interests—would undermine the rule of law.35
Of greatest relevance to this study, Jinks and Katyal indicate that the Posner/Sunstein approach
would “encourage courts to defer to self-interested positions taken by the executive…”.36 Whereas
Posner and Sunstein note that judiciaries are not politically accountable when they weigh in on
disputes related to foreign relations, Jinks and Katyal see that lack of political accountability (and
relatedly self-interested behaviour) as a seminal reason for courts to eschew deference. 37 Given
the contours of this study that has laid out how transnational MNC liability manifests in accordance
with governmental interests, I agree that an appointed judiciary ostensibly devoid of political
motivations is a rightful check on the power of elected branches of government. In fact, without
saying more about the topic, Jinks and Katyal specifically note that the self-interested nature of
the executive branch (that Posner and Sunstein couch in ‘accountability’ language) “often
restrict[s] only the liberty of foreigners—who cannot vote.”38 It is striking that Jinks and Katyal
intuitively single out foreign plaintiffs as I have done here.
Jinks and Katyal do not discount the possibility for judges to have motivations that are less than
objective, but they rightly state “that there is no particular case to be made for political bias of the
courts today.”39 Even the U.S. federal judiciary, which has become increasingly polarized in recent
years, does not always neatly make decisions in ‘hard cases’ along party lines, as empirical
evidence has indicated.40 And if Posner and Sunstein are correct that “judges do not lack biases of
their own,”41 those biases are not bolstered by economic benefits and the concern with re-election
as it is for the political branches of government. Moreover, for judicial decisions there are appeals
mechanism built into domestic adjudicative processes that are absent for the legislative and
executive branches.
b. Some restrained views
Like more progressive views on the topic, restrictive views of the judicial branch’s ability to make
or fill gaps in the law (in both domestic and transnational disputes) also go back centuries to
proponents of legal positivism. Jeremy Bentham (who Dworkin identifies as the father of the
positivist movement) characterized judicial lawmaking as ‘miserable sophistry’.42 David
Dyzenhaus attributes Bentham’s contempt of judicial lawmaking to two things. First, Bentham
was concerned that appointed judges who often come from elite social classes would be reticent
to progressive legislative reform. Second, common law judiciaries would be apt to see themselves
as safeguarding and controlling law’s meaning through what they saw as their place as “exclusive
35
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exponents of [artificial] reason.”43 In both instances, Bentham’s contempt of common law judges
stemmed from a perception that they viewed themselves as vanguards of social order.
More recently, in Proper Judicial Activism, Greg Jones argues that the American constitutional
structure stresses restraint such that judges only intervene when a decision is required to maintain
the separation of powers among the co-equal branches of government. He asserts, “[t]he
overarching practical principle guiding the Founders was a fear of the concentration of political
power in government.”44 For Jones, only that fear of concentrated power in the hands of the
political branches (particularly the executive branch) is what would warrant judicial intervention.
Contrary to the structural approach for which Jones argues, ‘improper’ judicial activism’ for him
is when judges construe that “law is only policy and that the judge should concentrate on building
the good society according to the judge’s own vision.”45 At odds with more expansive takes on
activism forwarded by, for instance, Schlesinger and Holmes, Jones does not see a place for
activism in cases that concern civil liberties or human rights. He decries this type of activism as
“judging in the service of conscience,” a characterization he makes of the progressive wing of the
Warren court.46
Jones’s ‘structural judicial activism’ promotes a majoritarian respect for the elected branches. In
his view, activism to overturn instances of the political branches acting ultra vires their powers
demonstrates fidelity to the constitution. Quoting another author, Jones takes the position that
“judges should always be hesitant to declare statues [sic] or governmental actions unconstitutional
[because it] … encourages the separation of powers, protects our democratic processes, and
preserves our fundamental rights.”47 In essence, Jones gives the political branches a carte blanche
to legislate and engage in foreign relations as they see fit as long as they do not impinge on the
powers of the co-equal branches of government.
Arguably one of the most prominent and consistent critics of judicial activism has been the
University of Chicago Law School professor Eric Posner. In a 2011 article with Daniel Abebe the
two authors take the position that ‘Foreign Affairs Legalism’ or FAL (where the judiciary weighs
in on disputes that abut foreign affairs), in fact, degenerates rather than spurs the advance of
international law. The FAL critics persist with some of the arguments refuted by more progressive
voices around judicial activism, namely that the fluidity of relations among states (Franck’s ‘Too
Much at Stake’ category) warrants a sphere in which the executive branch has the freedom to act
without being second-guessed by the judiciary.
Posner and Abebe view FAL as appearing in three distinct guises: i) the Benvenisti competitive or
zero-sum model i.e. more activist courts translates into a tightening sphere for the executive branch
to define international legal rules; ii) the Koh balanced institutional participation model i.e. courts
play a role in constructing shared norms and practices that are internalized into domestic laws and
politics; and iii) the ‘Slaughter’ transnational governance networks model i.e. inter-state judicial
43
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dialogue to craft a global rule of law without centralized global institutions. To Posner and Abebe,
these models all share some themes. First, they capture judiciaries as having the capacity as well
as an interest in restraining the executive branch. Second, judicial intervention promotes
international law. And third, rather than bolstering the global rule of law, executive pre-eminence
interferes with it as, to FAL proponents, executive branches often prioritize national self-interest
over multilateral efforts.
Posner and Abebe do not doubt that, at times, courts promote international legal rules, including
widely accepted norms of international human rights. However, they view judicial decisions as
having minimal effect on international law, a reality that militates in favour of more restraint.
Writer prior to Posner and Abebe’s critique of FAL, Franck saw this approach as one of the
bulwarks of the restraint camp. He remained unconvinced though that the judiciary should forego
its rightful jurisdiction to adjudicate a foreign relations-related matter simply because it may be
limited in its capacity to compel the executive branch to follow judicial decisions.
Posner and Abebe also view courts as being too slow and decentralized to develop coherent
policies that will affect international law. Furthermore, in their view, while judges may be
impartial, they are not accountable for their decisions like the political branches of government
who must survive the next poll or vote. That unaccountability gives them ‘little feel’ for
international politics and the public interest. Overall, they argue that judiciaries are not best-placed
to handle foreign affairs-related matters. For them, domestic doctrine has not developed to handle
such disputes—what Franck views as an historical accident that seeped into the common law
through dicta opinions.
It should be noted that the very characteristics that Posner and Abebe see as crutches to courts
weighing in on foreign affairs-related matters are what proponents of judicial activism see, in fact,
as strengths. When Posner and Abebe say courts are too decentralized, they are essentially
characterizing courts as structurally incapable of building a coherent foreign policy. Franck would
likely agree with that sentiment as, rather that delineating relations among state governments,
judiciaries are making one-off decisions in light of claims around individual rights and private law
remedies. Similarly, when Posner and Abebe say that courts have ‘little feel’ for international
politics, Falk would respond by noting the conflict of interest between the executive and judicial
branches, introduced above. Executives branches have conciliatory or settlement objectives
whereas judicial branches have rights-based objectives.
In the Yale Law Journal article to which Jinks and Katyal responded in 2007, Posner, along with
Cass Sunstein, argued that there should be a “Chevronizing” of foreign relations law in which
legislative vacuums—like the ones that will shortly be detailed around transnational business and
human rights litigation—remain the sole interpretive sphere of the executive branch.48 In instances
of penumbra, judiciaries should defer adjudication. In their view, a migration of administrative
law principles to ‘international relations doctrines’ (extraterritoriality, act of state, comity, and
others) is warranted as the executive branch is best placed to weigh the subsequent foreign relations
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costs and benefits.49 Chevronizing foreign relations would mean that courts would be left only to
determine the reasonableness of executive interpretations, which in the U.S. context at least has
rarely led to courts overruling executive conduct.50
Relatedly, the authors argued that the executive branch is in a better position to determine if a
particular course of action would result in retaliation by foreign states. To them, “courts should
generally defer to the executive on the ground that resolving ambiguities requires judgments of
policy and principle, and the foreign policy expertise of the executive places it in the best position
to make those judgments.”51 Finally, in instances when the executive branch intervenes in private
litigation, it would be afforded an even greater level of deference than the basic Chevron
reasonableness deference.52
One concern with Posner and Sunstein’s position on Chevronizing foreign relations is that it can
be read to prioritize the interests of the U.S. government to the ambivalence of remedial rights on
the part of foreign victims—another nod to the distinction of judicial policy and foreign policy to
which Franck pointed. In other words, Posner and Sunstein’s approach to the judicial role in
foreign relations law erases the plaintiffs seeking a private law remedy. Moreover, it erases the
fact that judges who adjudicate a specific dispute are not making foreign policy, but rather opining
on a single fact pattern—a dynamic, as mentioned, to which Franck was attuned. In short, Posner
and Sunstein take a ‘national interests’ approach rather than a victim-centric approach, an approach
which would translate into judiciaries taking deferential stances in transnational business and
human rights litigation.

II.

Home State Legality Gaps in Transnational Business and Human Rights
Litigation

Before making a case for expansive judicial activism in transnational business and human rights
litigation in common law home states, it is first necessary to establish why domestic judges ought
to assume that role. In short, the past few decades have witnessed a consistent stream of legislative
and judicial legality gaps in common law home state legal systems. As a consequence, Global
South host state victims have been hindered from pursuing private law remedies pursuant to
corporate human rights violations. Contemporary gaps can be broken into four categories: failed
legislation, deficient legislation, judicial restraint, and judicial deference.
Home state statutory provisions that, in theory, could ground transnational corporate human rights
litigation in a home state’s jurisdiction and allow for a duty of care on the part of an MNC’s parent
and/or subsidiary / contracting companies remain conspicuously absent. Home state legislatures
have previously exhibited ambivalence or outright opposition to statutes that would include
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provisions around a private right of action for corporate-related harms committed in host states,
predominantly in the Global South.
Alongside legislative gaps in common law home states, judiciaries have—although not
fatalistically—practiced restraint or taken deferential stances with respect to the courts or
governments of foreign host states. For instance, common law home state courts have restrictively
interpreted corporate separateness such that they have been unwilling to pierce the corporate veil.
U.S. courts have limited the Alien Tort Statute’s application to state actors and for violations that
take place within U.S. territory. And, at times, despite home state courts acknowledging that a host
state’s legal system is wholly deficient to adjudicate complex mass transnational tort claims against
an MNC, they have still deemed that legal system as being a more appropriate forum to hear such
a claim.
a. Failed Legislation
Despite recent efforts in some states to pass human rights transparency and due diligence statutes,
in the states where transnational business and human rights litigation has been commenced—the
U.S., U.K., and Canada being most notable—there are no provisions to allow for MNC tort liability
for host state human rights and/or environmental harms. On occasion, individual lawmakers have
introduced draft legislation only to be turned away legislatures.
i. Amendments to Alien Tort Statute
In its first two centuries, the 1789 Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), also known as the Alien Tort Claims
Act, was seldom invoked; and certainly not for transnational corporate-related cases.53 Since it has
been called upon in corporate tort claims for human rights violations, its ambiguity around the
types of defendants to which it applies and its territorial reach have barred Global South host state
plaintiffs from advancing claims in U.S. courts. Putnam states that “the requirement that tortious
conduct must be in violation of international law or a U.S. treaty – that creates the complication.”54
The stumbling block for Global South plaintiffs in, for instance, Kiobel, Sarei, and even in the
Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in Doe v. Nestlé has been that, without legislative guidance,
appeals courts see themselves as handcuffed to expand the traditional scope of customary
international law violations to non-state actors, including MNCs.55
In 2005, Diane Feinstein introduced the ATS Reform Act (“ATSRA”) to “clarify the jurisdiction”
of the U.S. federal courts in ATS claims.56 If it had passed, the act would have replaced the ATS’s
provision with the following:
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The district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action brought
by an alien asserting a claim of torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, piracy, slavery, or
slave trading if a defendant is a direct participant acting with specific intent to commit the
alleged tort. The district courts shall not have jurisdiction over such civil suits brought by
an alien if a foreign state is responsible for committing the tort in question within its
sovereign territory.57
Also, the ATSRA would have replaced the term ‘law of nations’ in the ATS’s current iteration
with a list of defined human rights violations. Directly relevant to transnational business and
human rights disputes, the ATSRA’s proposed defendants would have included “a partnership,
corporation or other legal entity organized under the laws of the United States or of a foreign
state.”58 Consequently, U.S. courts could no longer assert (even if in obiter) that corporate liability
falls outside the ATS’s scope.59
One week after introducing the proposed act—and before it could be considered by the Judiciary
Committee—Senator Feinstein withdrew the bill, citing backlash from human rights groups as a
reason for the bill’s withdrawal.60 However, that justification appears suspect given subsequent
research conducted by Jeffrey Davis on the concerted lobbying efforts that were undertaken by
business-friendly groups that opposed the ATSRA. Davis found that from 2003 up to when the
ATSRA was introduced in 2005, the Chamber of Commerce alongside other corporate-friendly
groups such as USA Engage and the Washington Legal Foundation consistently lobbied the U.S.
State Department, the Justice Department, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Trade
Representative to eliminate the potential for systemic corporate liability under the ATS and any
potential amendments.61 Irrespective of the reason, the ATSRA never passed into law.
In 2022, Senators Dick Durbin and Sherrod Brown introduced the Alien Tort Statute Clarification
Act (ATSCA). That proposed Act was a response to the 2021 decision in Doe v. Nestlé where the
Supreme Court rejected the ATS’s extraterritorial application. In Doe, a claim against a U.S.headquartered global food conglomerate for its part in aiding and abetting forced labour on cocoa
plantations in the Ivory Coast, eight justices applied the ‘focus test’ from RJR Nabisco to hold that
the child labour—the focus of the claim—occurred outside U.S. territory. Justice Thomas, who
penned the majority’s decision, explained that ‘mere corporate presence’ i.e. generic operational,
financial, and administrative decisions, on the part of a home state corporation or parent company
does not draw “a sufficient connection between the cause of action … and domestic conduct.”62
The ATSCA would clarify the ATS’s extraterritorial scope by stating that “the district courts of
the United States have extraterritorial jurisdiction over any tort … if … an alleged defendant is a
57
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national of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence … or an alleged
defendant is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the alleged defendant.”63
This types of automatic jurisdiction when a defendant is resident on U.S. territory would mirror
Article 4(1) of the Brussels I Regulation that has virtually made forum non conveniens dismissals
obsolete in the U.K.
Like Feinstein’s proposed ATSRA, the ATSCA is unlikely to pass into law. Distinct from the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and the Trafficking Victims Protections Reauthorization
Act which cannot compel corporations to compensate foreign plaintiffs,64 the ATSCA (like the
ATSRA) would allow for foreign plaintiffs to access corporate revenues. Given that some of the
largest U.S.-headquartered MNCs that undertake extractive and manufacturing operations in the
Global South have considerable lobbying power over Congress and have previously avowed to
oppose attempts at finding them liable for human rights violations abroad “until hell freezes
over”,65 it is improbable they will likely let up now. Consequently, the ambiguity in the American
legislative landscape for transnational corporate human rights claims will likely persist.
ii. U.K. Corporate Liability Bills
The British parliament’s concern about MNC litigation in its courts goes back at least two decades
after the House of Lords ruled in 1998 that a transnational claim against the mining company Rio
Tinto should proceed in British rather than Namibian courts.66 Uncomfortable with that
determination, the Lord Chancellor’s Department, in a restricted consultation letter, argued that
increased litigation against British-headquartered MNCs in British courts could spark an ‘exit
threat’ in which MNCs would be inclined to move their headquarters to jurisdictions where they
would be less likely to have to defend transnational claims in court.67
Introduced in June 2002 as a private member’s bill by Labour MP Linda Perham, the Corporate
Responsibility Bill would have been applicable to U.K.-registered companies and their foreign
subsidiaries.68 It would have required U.K. corporations to prepare and publish annual reports
assessing “policies and performance in regards to environmental, social and economic impacts”
and to minimize the effects of those impacts.69 The Bill specifically included provisions that would
ensure parent companies were not shielded from liability for actions of a foreign subsidiary.
Section 6(1)(c) of the Bill stated that a parent company would be liable for compensatory damages
if it was responsible for “serious physical or mental injury to persons working in or affected by
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those activities; serious harm to the environment; or both.”70 Other provisions explicitly stated the
company’s corporate structure is not a barrier to a liability determination.71 In other words, the
corporate veil, discussed as part of the judicial restraint that British and other home state courts
have exhibited, could no longer be a doctrinal barrier to MNC liability.
When first introduced, the Bill received widespread praise. Signaling support of the Bill, more
than 300 MPs signed an Early Day Motion.72 It was also praised by the Corporate Responsibility
Coalition, comprised of Amnesty International U.K., Christian Aid, and Friends of the Earth.73 A
poll conducted by the British Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs found that 71%
of the public agreed that businesses should report their environmental impact to the government.74
Despite its backing inside and outside the government, Ms. Perham withdrew the Bill before a vote
could take place.75 While there is no published or online information available as to why the Bill
was withdrawn, the following Hansard record of 19 July 2002 implicitly says it all:76
Order for Second Reading read.
Hon. Members: Object.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Second Reading what day? No day named.
Dr. Julian Lewis: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I seek your guidance once
again. Is there any way in which at least we can place on the record the fact that now,
Labour Back Benchers' Bills are being killed by their own Government Whips?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I think the hon. Gentleman has just done so.
After the demise of her initial bill, In October 2002 Perham tabled the Corporate Responsibility
(environmental, Social and Financial Report) Bill. The new Bill was much like the first one—
except for one key provision. The new Bill was stripped of any discussion of parent company
liability included in the first Bill.77 In their book The Governance Gap, Penelope Simons and
Audrey Macklin have written that “there is no indication that the bill was debated.”78 Since these
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attempts, no legislation has been introduced in parliament that would allow for the tort liability of
parent and/or subsidiary corporations for human rights and environmental violations abroad.
iii. Canadian Corporate Liability Bills
Like the U.S. and U.K, there is continued uncertainty in Canada with regard to the ability of host
state plaintiffs to seek compensatory remedies for corporate human rights and environmental
violations. Each entitled An Act to amend the Federal Courts Act (international promotion and
protection of human rights), Bills C-323, C-354, and C-331 were introduced by New Democrat
MP Peter Julian in 2009, 2011, and 2015.79 As the title suggests, the bills would have amended the
Federal Courts Act80 to expressly permit foreign claimants to initiate tort claims for international
human rights matters. Similar to the failed ATSRA in the U.S., the proposed bills listed specific
human rights violations that would fall within the Federal Court’s jurisdiction. These included, but
were not limited to, genocide, slavery, extrajudicial killing, torture, and arbitrary detention. 81
After a nearly decade-long wait, the bill reached the floor of the House of Commons in June 2019
and was rejected by a vote of 238-49.82 Perhaps to not present the apprehension of promoting MNC
profits and jobs over international human rights, MPs cited procedural hurdles to the bill’s
adoption.83 Conservative MP Marilyn Gladu argued that it would be imprudent to give the Federal
Court jurisdiction as she considered it (i.e. the Court) to be in ‘tatters’84—a perplexing (and
arguably disingenuous) sentiment about a long-standing judicial venue that spans all Canadian
provinces and covers all matters within the federal government’s jurisdiction. Liberal MP Greg
Fergus cautioned against a procedure akin to the ATS, arguing the latter is a mere relic from
America’s first Congress.85 He also argued that, rather than a statutory amendment, it is better for
the common law to evolve gradually, “incrementally taking into account developments in other
jurisdictions.”86 That last remarks implicitly signals an accepting view toward Canadian judges
taking a more activist stance to fill legislative gaps perpetuated by Parliament.
In March of 2022, Mr. Julian tabled another private member’s bill, C-262, The Corporate
Responsibility to Protect Human Rights Act. Similar to the other bills, noted above Bill C-262
provides a private right of action for “[a] person who alleges that they have suffered loss or damage
as a result of a failure by an entity to comply with its obligations to prevent adverse impacts.” 87
Bill C-262 also allows for litigation when a corporate entity fails to develop and implement due
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diligence procedures to mitigation the potential for human rights-related harms in the course of
business operations.88 As of this article’s writing, Parliament has not voted on Bill C-262.
However, given that Mr. Julian’s is part of the minority New Democrat party and the fact that the
bill, like the others above, was presented as a private member’s bill without widespread support
from the governing Liberals, there is very little chance that it will become law.
b. Deficient Legislation
Not only are there examples of home state bills around transnational corporate tort liability that
have not passed into law, there is existing legislation that considers corporate responsibility and
measures that may help to improve corporate behaviour abroad, but does not include mechanisms
for host state victims to sue MNCs in a domestic court and be compensated for personal and
environmental harms.
i. U.K. Companies Act
With 1300 sections and 16 schedules, the Companies Act 2006 is the primary source of corporate
law in the U.K. It updated the Companies Act 1985 after recommendations made in July 2001 in
the British Company Law Review Steering Group’s final report.89 Simons and Macklin have
written that “continued lobbying led to the inclusion of a limited number of CSR obligations”90 in
the Act, which requires directors to supply “information about … social and community issues,
including information about any policies of the company in relation to those matters and the
effectiveness of these policies.”91 The obligations apply only to publicly-traded companies with
the caveat that the information only need be provided “to the extent necessary for an understanding
of the development, performance or positions of the company’s business.”92
Muchlinski criticized the Steering Group’s final report for omitting recommendations on the
liability of corporate groups.93 This was likely not an oversight. As Mwaura noted, “one of the key
reasons why [the Steering Group] … shied away from making recommendations for attributing
liability to United Kingdom holding companies for act of their foreign subsidiaries was the fact
that this was going to make the United Kingdom a less competitive legal environment for
business.”94 Extensive lobbying efforts deterred the Steering Group from even including
recommendations in its final report about directors’ liability.95 As such, MNC liability for
transnational tort claims was even farther from reach.
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ii. U.K. Modern Slavery Act
In many circles, the Modern Slavery Act has been welcomed as a culminated success that seeks to
weed out human trafficking in transnational supply chains. Like the Companies Act and other
legislation discussed in this section, the Modern Slavery Act, while including provisions around
criminal liability and reparations order against accused persons, does not provide for corporate tort
liability in instances of slavery, servitude and forced and compulsory labour. Moreover, Section
54 provides for disclosure requirement of U.K.-domiciled corporations in their supply chains, but
does not contemplate private law liability or compensation to victims when those supply chains
concern human trafficking or related offences.96
To date, there have not been attempts to expand the Act’s scope such that it could allow for the
tort liability of U.K.-domiciled corporations. In both Vedanta and Okpabi, detailed below, where
the U.K. Supreme Court recently held that there is, in theory, a duty of care on the part of U.K
parent companies that exert substantial control of overseas subsidiaries, the Act was neither argued
nor invoked by the Court as a basis to ground corporate liability.
iii. Foreign Corruption Acts
There is legislation in all three common law home states discussed in this part that prohibits
corruption by corporate actors in their business operations abroad, but does not include provisions
around corporate human rights violations or the potential to commence tort claims when personal
and/or environmental harms are committed. As an example, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA), which has the relatively the same scope as U.K. Bribery Act and Canada’s Corruption
of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA), mandates that MNCs that operate abroad adhere to strict
accounting controls and mandatory disclosure requirements. MNCs can be subject to criminal
penalties for payments made to foreign officials linked to securing or retaining contracts.97
The FCPA and related legislation in other common law home states exemplify that governments
have exhibited the political will to pass legislation that enriches them through hefty fine amounts,
but will not pass legislation that allows for corporate revenues to be syphoned to victims of
corporate human rights and environmental harms abroad. In his book Between Impunity and
Imperialism: The Regulation of Transnational Bribery, Kevin Davis writes, “[i]n principle, the
resulting funds [from FCPA prosecutions] could be channeled to victims of corruption … To date,
however, the funds collected rarely have been used for the purpose of compensation. They
typically are remitted to the Treasury of the United States…”98
Aside from the FCPA and other legislation above, in October 2016 the U.K. parliament introduced
the Criminal Finances Bill, which amended parts of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Like the
FCPA, Bribery Act, and CFPOA, Part 5 of the Act allows for the U.K. government—but not
victims of corporate abuse—to recover civil damages for property that has been obtained through
unlawful conduct, domestically or abroad. Pursuant to the amendment, unlawful conduct includes
96
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gross human rights violations, specifically torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 99
Rather than victims themselves who would then stand to be compensated, the U.K. government is
able to pursue an individual or corporation that has benefited from human rights abuses committed
abroad. As such, the amendments to the Act fortified the government’s ability to be compensated,
leaving victims in a lurch.
c. Judicial Restraint
In transnational business and human rights litigation, common law home state courts have
routinely decided to take conservative stances on doctrines that would otherwise allow them to
assert jurisdiction or impute liability on MNCs for human rights or environmental harms abroad.
Here, I review restrained stances taken with respect to applying customary international law to
corporate actors, expansive notions of the corporate veil, and the extraterritorial reach of home
state statutes.
i. Corporate Customary International Law
Home state courts have struggled to reconcile traditional interpretations of international law with
the reality that the contemporary corporate form increasingly performs government-like functions
and asserts power and authority over individuals in a way akin to governments.100 Home state
courts have rejected progressive notions of international law that would bring private corporations
within the realm of customary and peremptory norms traditionally applied to states101 and
international organizations constituted at the consent of states.102 Through a formalistic approach
that depicts a by-gone era, common law home state courts have impeded litigation against MNCs
by differentiating the international law obligations of corporations from those of state actors.
By and large, U.S. courts have rejected any possibility that MNCs can be subject to customary
international law norms; and the Supreme Court of Canada has tepidly endorsed a ‘human-centric’
turn in international law, even though it has not explicitly allowed for MNCs to fall within
international law’s ambit. These debates around the scope and application of international law
harkens back more than a half century to Jessup’s portrayal of a fictional debate between what he
termed ‘orthodox’ and ‘iconoclastic’ positions.103 That debate continues until today without clear
answers and presents (at times insurmountable) difficulties for Global South host state plaintiffs
seeking compensatory redress from MNCs.104
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Despite Koh’s assertion that it is a myth that U.S. courts cannot hold private corporations civilly
liable under ATS claims,105 since the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Tel-Oren, U.S. jurisprudence has
progressively developed in a fashion that distinguishes state and corporate liability.106 For instance,
Jama concerned domestic physical and mental abuse against asylum seekers held in a private
correctional facility that had contracted with the U.S. government.107 The detainees commenced
an ATS suit alleging the facility violated ‘the law of nations’ (customary international law) by
subjecting them to cruel treatment and punishment. The district court in New Jersey rejected the
argument that the ATS did not apply to the facility’s actions. It held the private defendants could
be liable for a tort claim pursuant to a violation of the ‘law of nations’ as it had contracted with the
government. Debevoise J. wrote, “by virtue of the contract with INS [Immigration and
Naturalization Service] to perform governmental detention functions these defendants became
state actors and were not acting simply as a private corporation or private individuals.”108
Likewise, in the more recent case of Salim, two psychologists had contracted with the U.S.
government to provide expertise on how to conduct ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ in black
sites abroad, resulting in ATS claims alleging tort and other human rights violations.109 Before the
individual defendants settled for a confidential amount, a district court judge denied their motion
to dismiss, concluding that the contractors were sufficiently connected to the government and thus
could be held liable under the ATS for violating the ‘law of nations.’110 The court implicitly
accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that the individual defendants “played a crucial role in
developing, refining, and supporting” the abusive techniques.111
The decisions in Jama and Salim employed functional analyses looking at defendants’ actions and
responsibilities rather than their formal classification as private actors. Upon determining that
private defendants had performed a government function on behalf of the state—the detention of
asylum seekers or interrogation of perceived enemy combatants—the courts characterized them as
state actors with international law obligations. Despite similar fact patterns and allegations to those
in Jama and Salim, ATS claims against MNCs operating in the Global South—even when those
MNCs have contracted with the state—have been dismissed due to excessively traditional
interpretations of international law.
One set of examples in which ATS claims against a corporate actor for abuses in the Global South
were dismissed stemmed from allegations of torture and cruel and unusual treatment in Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. On the premise that the ‘law of nations’ does not apply to private corporations
district courts in Saleh and Ibrahim dismissed ATS claims commenced on behalf of hundreds of
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Iraqi citizens who alleged torture and other physical abuse by security forces employed by the
corporate defendant.112
What is striking is that the defendants in the Abu Ghraib cases and Jama performed very similar
functions. They were both responsible for housing inmates who were detained or captured by
American government personnel. The distinguishing feature between the two was how courts
characterized their relationship with the U.S. government. The Jama court characterized the
institutional defendant as a government contractor. The Saleh and Ibrahim courts characterized the
defendant as a corporate actor that acted at an arms-length from the government. Pursuant to their
limited legal status under international law, corporations such as the defendant in the Abu Ghraib
cases have evaded ‘law of nations’ obligations whereas domestic corporations and individuals that
contract with the government are considered as extensions of home state governments and subject
to customary and/or peremptory norms.
The arguably arbitrary result established by district courts has been upheld by appellate courts that
have contributed to eroding (and perhaps obliterating) the potential for transnational MNC liability
under the ATS. In Kiobel, a case involving allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention, torture,
and extrajudicial killings on the part of a multinational oil company operating in Nigeria, the
Second Circuit in a 2-1 split departed from its previous decision in Flores.113 It stated, “[c]ustomary
international law is composed only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out
of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern. The marked characteristic of the whole system
is a commonality of interest aligned against the enemies of all mankind. The idea of corporate
liability does not withstand scrutiny in that light.”114 In a related decision, the Court of Appeals
concluded there was no customary norm of corporate liability to ground an ATS claim.115 As
previous courts had “never extended the scope of [customary international law] liability to a
corporation”116 the Second Circuit was not willing to depart with establish international law
interpretations in order to apply the ATS to the defendant MNC.
In 2018, the Supreme Court released its decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank plc,117 an ATS case against
a Jordanian bank with a U.S. branch. The dispute, at last, called for a ruling as to whether the ATS
applies to non-state actors. Justice Kennedy along with the Court’s four conservative judges held
that allowing foreign corporations to fall within the ATS’s ambit would impinge on U.S. foreign
relations—a matter beyond the judiciary’s powers.118 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, Kennedy tackled the separate issue of private corporate liability for customary
international law violations. He followed the Second Circuit’s approach in Kiobel that the ATS
applies to states and individuals who act under the colour of law since that is how custom
developed post-World War II.119 However, absent express legislation, the ATS does not apply to
112
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juridical persons such as corporations.120 He also agreed with Kiobel that, to date, there is no
‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ norm of corporate liability under international law.121
Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Canadian courts have not completely shut the door on corporate
liability under customary international law—although their jurisprudence is practically no further
ahead. Without legislative guidance, Canadian courts have been left to reach for doctrinal
interpretations that are well outside traditional understandings. In the Supreme Court of Canada’s
2020 decision in Nevsun, a transnational human rights claim on behalf of Eritrean plaintiffs against
a Canadian mining company, the majority held that it was not plain and obvious that a tort
characterized as a violation of customary international law was bound to fail. Passing that low bar
only meant that the plaintiffs who alleged acts of torture, forced labour, and arbitrary detention
were allowed to proceed with their case, but not necessarily that customary international law norms
apply to corporations.122 In Nevsun, the Supreme Court held that “a compelling argument can …
be made that since customary international law is part of Canadian common law, a breach by a
Canadian company can theoretically be directly remedied.”123
It is up for debate whether the Nevsun majority actually moved the common law forward with
respect to corporate liability for human rights violations in the Global South. Realistically, the
plaintiffs overcame a low-threshold dismissal motion on a set of theoretical bases that may not
have been adopted had the matter proceeded to the high court on its merits. Future Canadian courts
can wholly ignore the Nevsun decision and revert back to traditional notions of international law
that have developed over past decades and centuries—and were endorsed by a minority of the
justices. More broadly, without legislative guidance from non-elected branches of government,
Canadian courts are left without systemic principles that govern when and how to apply
international law to corporations.
ii. The Corporate Veil
Corporate separateness is the law’s recognition that each corporate entity is subject to limited
liability. A subset of corporate separateness is referred as the ‘corporate veil’, a term that applies
when one corporation owns some or all of the shares of another corporation. 124 Absent fraud, a
determination that one corporation is an alter ego of another corporation, or a determination that a
foreign corporation is “so continuous and systematic” with a domestic corporation so as to be at
home,125 courts have been bound by a legal formalism that dictates centuries-old precepts of limited
liability be respected.
Without legislation to override formalistic notions of corporate separateness in transnational
business and human rights disputes, MNCs have successfully invoked the veil to dismiss tort120
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based claims. Otherwise, as in recent British transnational corporate tort cases discussed below,
the threshold to impute the actions of one corporate entity onto another has been crafted such that
a home state corporation must exercise a significant degree of control over a host state
corporation—a relationship that can potentially be tweaked to ensure that home state corporations
routinely avoid liability for the tortious conduct of a host state subsidiary.
To begin with the U.S., courts there have upheld corporate separateness to curtail transnational tort
claims for human rights violations in the Global South. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., Burmese citizens
alleged that a number of oil and gas MNCs were complicit in the use of forced labour to construct
a pipeline.126 After refusing to assert personal jurisdiction over the host state subsidiaries under the
test for specific in personam jurisdiction,127 the court turned to the ‘minimum contacts’ test for
general jurisdiction.128 In a case that involves domestic and foreign corporations, that test calls for
a court to “engage in a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the subsidiaries’ contacts are
properly attributed to the [parent company] defendant.”129
The court affirmed the general rule that a parent and subsidiary are separate legal entities such that
the subsidiary’s host state conduct cannot (in most circumstances) form the basis for the parent’s
liability. It applied Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedents to conclude that the parent
company was not an alter ego of the foreign subsidiary and that the foreign subsidiary was not the
parent company’s agent.130 Evidence adduced on appeal about an intertwined relationship between
the U.S. parent and host state subsidiaries around, for instance, capital expenditures, investments,
general business policies, and even shared directors and officers did not convince the court to
pierce the veil.131 Rather, like the current state of U.K. law, discussed below, the Court required
day-to-day control or significant managerial intervention on the part of the parent company over a
foreign subsidiary.132
In the U.K., the Brussels I Regulation (B1R) turns a personal jurisdiction inquiry into one that
concerns a British parent company’s duty of care to foreign plaintiffs. Explicitly, Article 4(1) of
the B1R reads that “persons domiciled in a [E.U.] Member State shall, whatever their nationality,
be sued in the courts of that Member State.”133 That provision encompasses corporate persons.
Previously, the entity theory—as it manifests through tort law principles—was a hallmark of U.K.
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corporate veil dismissals. And although more recent transnational cases have surpassed lowthreshold dismissal motions, there remains a relatively high bar for U.K. parent companies to owe
a duty of care to host state plaintiffs. Moreover, from its recent judgments, the Supreme Court has
opened a path for British MNCs to distance themselves from host state operations and
consequently evade tort liability on a consistent basis.
In AAA, former employees of a British parent company’s Kenyan subsidiary commenced a
transnational claim in British courts against both companies alleging negligence on the MNC’s
part for harm incurred in the course of tribal violence that left seven dead and hundreds injured. 134
To determine whether there was sufficient proximity between the parties to ground a tort law duty
of care, the Court of Appeal analyzed the relationship between the corporate parent and its overseas
subsidiary. Although the Court acknowledged that the British parent, through a separate holding
company, owned 88.2% of subsidiary’s shares, it dismissed the claim on the basis that each
company was a separate legal person.135 The Court surmised that veil piercing would turn on the
facts of a particular case when a parent company “having greater scope to intervene in the affairs
of its subsidiary than another third party might have, has taken action of a kind which is capable
of meeting the relevant test for imposition of a duty of care in respect of a parent.”136
Previously, British courts also distinguished a domestic parent company from a foreign subsidiary
under the entity theory on the basis that a subsidiary is domiciled outside the U.K. Examples of
this type of dismissal can be seen in the Anglo American Group litigation in which South African
employees of a British MNC contracted silicosis and silico-tuberculosis.137 In Vava and Young,
foreign plaintiffs were forced to bring claims in British courts against only the South African
subsidiary as there was no viable claim against the U.K. parent company that had acquired the
subsidiary after the alleged violations took place. The parties agreed that to establish domicile
under the B1R, a corporation’s central place of administration is determined by where, factually,
“the important decisions are made; the entrepreneurial management takes place.”138
In Vava, both the chambers judge and the Court of Appeal held that the corporation’s important
decisions were made in South Africa. The Court of Appeal held that central administration lies
where the company makes essential operational decisions. It made a distinction between
‘influencing’ decisions and ‘determining’ decisions and concluded that the subsidiary’s
‘determining’ decisions took place in South Africa.139 As the subsidiary was deemed to be
domiciled outside the U.K., there was no basis for the British courts to assert jurisdiction. In a
related 2014 decision, the Court of Appeal dismissed the transnational claim in Young by again
concluding that British courts did not have jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary, which was
domiciled elsewhere.140
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As mentioned, two recent transnational cases against British MNCs that involved an interpretation
of the corporate veil have survived dismissal motions that only require plaintiffs to demonstrate
their claims have a ‘real prospect of success.’141 From those cases, British common law around
parent company liability has evolved in a way that requires a significant degree of control over a
host state subsidiary. In effect, these recent Supreme Court decisions have empowered British
MNCs to alter their transnational corporate relationships to ensure that it is very difficult for host
state plaintiffs to meet the ‘control threshold’.
Vedanta was a transnational claim commenced in a British court on behalf of 1,826 Zambian
villagers who alleged that the U.K.-based Vedanta Resources Plc (Vedanta) and its Zambian
subsidiary, Konkola Copper Mines plc (KCM), polluted local waterways resulting in personal and
financial injury to local residents. In its 2019 decision, the Supreme Court held there was an
arguable case that Vedanta sufficiently intervened in KCM’s day-to-day management. Among
other things, the court relied on evidence that Vedanta provided health, safety, and environmental
training to KCM and vowed in public statements to address environmental and technical
shortcomings in KCM’s mining infrastructure.142
In 2021, the Supreme Court released its decision in Okpabi overturning High Court and Court of
Appeal decisions that held Royal Dutch Shell Plc (RDS), as an anchor defendant under the B1R,
did not owe a duty of care to the Nigerian plaintiffs.143 Like Vedanta, Okpabi reached the Supreme
Court in the context of a dismissal motion where the threshold for the claim to proceed was whether
there was a real issue to be tried.144 The Okpabi Court relied heavily on Vedanta to conclude that
RDS could, in theory, owe the plaintiffs a duty of care.
Like for the parent company in Vedanta, in Okpabi there was evidence adduced that RDS exercised
a high level of control, direction, and oversight over the Nigerian subsidiary’s operation of its oil
infrastructure.145 The Court was left to grapple with whether a parent company owes a duty of care
to host state plaintiffs when it i) exercises day-to-day control over a subsidiary’s material
operations; and ii) issues mandatory policies and standards meant to apply throughout a group of
companies.146 The Court of Appeal distinguished between those two scenarios and concluded that
a parent only owes a duty of care in the former.147
Along with its conclusion that mandatory policies and standards among a corporate group are not
indicative of a parent company’s duty of care to host state plaintiffs, the Court of Appeal in Okpabi
held that RDS did not exercise the necessary degree of control over “practices or failures which
are the subject of the claim.”148 The Supreme Court disagreed in both respects for at least a few
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reasons. First, the Court had already determined in Vedanta that group-wide policies and standards
can give rise to a duty of care—a principle overlooked by the Court of Appeal.149
Second, the Supreme Court distinguished between de jure financial control and de facto
managerial control, holding that a duty of care may arise in either circumstance. Again, it relied
on its decision in Vedanta where Lord Briggs stated that “the parent may incur the relevant
responsibility to third parties if, in published materials, it holds itself out as exercising that degree
of supervision and control of its subsidiaries, even if it does not in fact do so.”150 And third, the
Court of Appeal erred by surmising parent company liability as a distinct category of negligence
that must satisfy the three-part Caparo test.151 Based on these reasons, the Court held that the
plaintiffs’ claim, as crafted, stood a real prospect of success. As such, the transnational case was
allowed to proceed.
A number of issues arise from the U.K. Supreme Court’s decisions in Vedanta and Okpabi. Like
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Nevsun, discussed below, the U.K. decisions are not,
in fact, merits determinations that move the law around transnational MNC liability forward in any
substantial or systematic way. Rather, they were rendered in the context of early-stage dismissal
motions that allow a claim to move forward, but do not necessarily mean it will be successful on
the merits. Moreover, it is arguable that the U.K. decisions (like Nevsun) only garnered the support
of the majority of the judges because they reached the Court on a jurisdictional (rather than merits)
issue. Given the low threshold the plaintiffs are asked to meet and the overall insignificance of the
decisions given that the Court was not required to opine on the merits of the case, it is safe to say
the veil remains a doctrinal limitation in U.K. courts.
Additionally, the Supreme Court decisions have opened a relatively easy pathway for parent
companies to alter their relationships with host state subsidiaries and affiliates in order to evade
transnational liability. After the decisions in Vedanta and Okpabi, corporations domiciled in the
U.K. can continue to profit off the operations of host state corporations yet distance themselves in
day-to-day control and oversight. Moreover, parent companies can decide to eliminate group-wide
mandatory policies and standards and replace them with policies and standards devised and
implemented by each separate corporate entity, with the ultimate result being the same as groupwide policies and standards. In theory, according to the principles laid out in Vedanta and Okpabi
those steps should nullify a parent company’s duty of care to host state plaintiffs.
Finally, the corporate veil as a judicial gap for Global South host state plaintiffs to pursue
compensatory remedies has also manifested in transnational claims brought to Canadian courts.
Das concerned transnational claims brought by Bengali plaintiffs after the Rana Plaza collapse
that killed thousands of workers employs by local companies that supplied garments to Canadian
MNC Loblaws.152 The plaintiffs brought tort claims against Loblaws and Bureau Veritas, a Frenchincorporated consulting company that conducted ‘social audits’ to ensure that Loblaws’s CSR
policies were being implemented at the Rana Plaza and other manufacturing facilities. Unlike the
U.S. and U.K. cases, discussed above, the corporate entities in Das were not related through a
149
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traditional parent-subsidiary relationship. Rather, Loblaws entered into a contract with Bureau
Veritas’s Bengali subsidiary to undertake the social audits.
In a lengthy 2017 decision, Perell J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the matter.
Even though the primary basis for dismissing the transnational claim was that the plaintiffs’
allegations were limitations-barred under Bengali law,153 Perell J. proceeded to analyze the
jurisdictional and liability issues as if the limitations bar did not apply. He utilized the three-part
Caparo test to determine whether Loblaws would have owed the plaintiffs a duty of care under
Bengali law. And like the British cases, he concluded that Loblaws did not have sufficient control
over the Bengali manufacturing companies most proximate to the plaintiffs. Therefore, it did not
owe the plaintiffs a duty of care.154
Under Bengali (British) law, Perell J. distinguished Das from the English Court of Appeal’s
decision in Chandler v. Cape plc that found direct parent company liability against the British
corporation.155 Unlike Das, in Chandler the British parent corporation owned the host state
subsidiary. More importantly, the parent company exerted significant control over the subsidiary
and had detailed knowledge about the dangerous working conditions (and what to do about them)
that eventually caused the foreign plaintiffs harm. In Das, Perell J. noted that Loblaws was not an
operating parent company, but simply entered into contracts with Bengali companies to supply it
with garments as well as ensure adherence to its CSR strategy.156 In other words, Loblaws did not
exercise day-to-day control over the Bengali companies and possessed little (if any) knowledge of
the danger in which the foreign plaintiffs found themselves by working at the Rana Plaza.
Perell J. also analyzed the plaintiffs’ ability to sue Loblaws under Ontario law. He held there was
no basis to ignore corporate separateness to construe the (in)actions of the Bengali companies that
led to the building collapse to that of Loblaws. He distinguished Das from the Superior Court’s
decision in Choc v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc. in which the court found direct parent company liability
on the part of the Canadian-domiciled corporation without having to pierce the veil—a first for a
transnational human rights claim in Canada.157 Rather than assess proximity between the parent
company and the foreign plaintiffs like the court in Choc, in Das Perell J. considered the salient
factor to be the level of control the Canadian company possessed over the host state companies
that were most proximate to the foreign plaintiffs—a more traditional veil piercing analysis. He
again concluded that the lack of day-to-day oversight on the part of the Canadian parent company
meant there was an insufficient degree of control that would otherwise permit him to ignore
corporate separateness.158
iii. Extraterritoriality
In U.S. jurisprudence, the canon of statutory interpretation known as the presumption against
extraterritorial provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
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application, it has none.”159 To assert jurisdiction, U.S. courts have required express congressional
intent of extraterritorial statutory application.160 Underlying this deferential tone to congress is a
concern expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Aramco that “the Judiciary … not erroneously
adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended
by the political branches.”161 The presumption has evolved over time and as the Supreme Court
has interpreted different statutes. After the Court’s 2016 decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Cmty, there appears to be a three-step determination of a statute’s extraterritorial application: i)
express congressional intent; ii) focus i.e. whether the provision in question involves domestic
application; and iii) injuries on U.S. territory.162
With the doctrine well-established, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kiobel rejected the ATS’s
extraterritorial application in transnational human rights claims against British, Dutch, and U.S.
oil companies. The Court affirmed the rule that where parties and actions are strictly outside U.S.
territory, the matter remains beyond the ATS’s scope.163 The Court’s ruling in Kiobel fell in line
with how the presumption developed over the preceding decades. Applying the presumption to the
ATS, the Court’s majority wrote in Kiobel that “[n]othing in the text of the statute suggests that
congress intended causes of action recognized under it to have extraterritorial reach.”164 Finding
authority in Morrison, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Kiobel left the door open for matters
that touch and concern U.S. territory with sufficient force.165 However, absent congressional action
to enact a statute more specific than the ATS—something congress has refused to do—the
presumption against extraterritoriality remains a barrier to transnational claims against
corporations for alleged conduct abroad.166
In Doe v. Nestlé, an eight-judge majority of the high court ruled that the ‘focus’ of the host state
plaintiffs’ claims—the child labour in the Ivory Coast—occurred outside U.S. territory. As the
majority affirmed Kiobel that the ATS does not have extraterritorial reach except in rare instances,
the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed. Justice Thomas, who penned the majority’s decision,
explained that ‘mere corporate presence’ i.e. generic operational, financial, and administrative
decisions, on the part of a home state corporation or parent company does not draw “a sufficient
connection between the cause of action … and domestic conduct.”167
d. Judicial Deference
Other than home state decisions in which courts have taken restrained approaches to dismiss
transnational business and human rights litigation or failed to advance doctrine in a substantial
way, there are a set of doctrines that have been invoked to dismissal transnational business and
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human rights litigation out of deference to host state governments and courts. Here, I briefly review
forum non conveniens and act or state reasons forwarded by U.S. and Canadian courts.
i. Forum Non Conveniens168
Forum non conveniens (FNC) sits at the intersection of judicial and political considerations in
transnational disputes that often leads home state courts to take deferential postures.169 Over the
past few decades, the doctrine’s development has been propelled by transnational litigation
involving MNC defendants that seek FNC dismissals, “not necessarily because they prefer the
alternative forum, but because this will often represent the last they will see of the litigation.”170 In
FNC analyses, U.S. courts tend to prioritize deference to a host state’s sovereignty over its own
national interest in adjudicating a transnational matter that implicates a U.S. MNC. In other words,
FNC considerations have routinely been undergirded by notions of comity.171
Gardner argues this focus on comity is misplaced because the Supreme Court in Gilbert was not
necessarily concerned about the integrity of another state’s sovereignty. Rather, Gilbert was about
the administration of justice in the federal court system among U.S. states.172 Despite Gardner’s
opposition to comity-centric approaches to FNC, U.S. courts have dismissed transnational human
rights cases involving MNCs on such grounds. Bhopal, a transnational claim involving an
explosion at a gas plant in India owned by a subsidiary of the U.S. corporation Union Carbide, is
an oft-cited example.173
The Indian government, recognizing myriad deficiencies in its own legal system, chose to
commence a transnational claim in New York where both the district court and court of appeals
dismissed the case on FNC grounds.174 Indicating comity concerns, both courts took the position
that adjudicating the claims in the parent company’s home state would impinge on India’s
sovereignty and rob it of the opportunity to develop its own tort laws.175 However, evidence
submitted in the course of the FNC dismissal motion painted a picture of the Indian legal system
as far from an “independent and legitimate judiciary” able “to mete out fair and equal justice.”
Rather, the evidence overwhelmingly suggested that India was ill-equipped to handle the complex
factual and legal issues related to the matter. The Indian government submitted evidence
substantiating that its legal system lacked sufficient tort precedents relating to personal injury. 176
It also submitted evidence of widespread corruption, endemic delays, and the absence of class
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actions and contingency fee regimes.177 Yet, those assertions were of “no moment with respect to
the adequacy of the Indian courts.”178
The courts also recognized that were there to be a liability finding warranting damages in the
Indian system, the case would, in essence, have to be re-litigated in U.S. courts in the course of
enforcement proceedings. To square the circle such that re-litigation would not be required, one of
the conditions the district court imposed as part of the FNC dismissal was that the MNC defendant
would have to abide by an Indian court’s judgment. As that condition was waived on appeal, 179 it
is a wonder how the matter was dismissed to a legal system implicitly recognized by a U.S. court
as being inadequate to adjudicate the novel and complex issues related to the transnational claim.
After the court of appeals’ decision, the case proceeded in the Indian courts with all the expected
troubles noted in the FNC adequacy analysis. The claims were never adjudicated on the merits.
Two years after the U.S. dismissal and five years after the explosion, the parent company settled
with the plaintiffs for an arguably paltry sum of $470 million USD in return for a full waiver of all
legal claims.180
To the extent that some redress resulted from the transnational claim—minimal as it was—it must
be taken into account that Bhopal, in part, ended in a settlement rather than a jurisdictional or
early-stage dismissal in Indian courts due to the public outcry over the explosion as well as the
Indian government’s decision to act as a representative plaintiff. Other U.S. FNC dismissals in
transnational cases have not ended with even that modicum of success. One example is Sequihua,
a transnational claim on behalf of Ecuadorian plaintiffs against Texaco for wastewater
contamination in the course of oil extraction.181
In Sequihua, the district court formally separated out comity and FNC considerations but addressed
sovereignty interests in both to ultimately dismiss the claim. Following Piper, the court reiterated
that foreign plaintiffs are afforded less deference in forum choice. 182 The Court held that Ecuador
was the sovereign state with the primary interest in the dispute and should be the site of
adjudication, even though the defendant MNC was headquartered in Texas.183 And like Bhopal,
the court found Ecuador to be an adequate forum even though “it may not provide the same benefits
as the American system.”184
Another FNC example where home state courts deferred to host state judiciaries involves
transnational claims against Del Monte when Guatemalan banana farm workers accused the
American MNC of arbitrarily detaining and threatening to kill them after failed labor negotiations.
Although the eleventh circuit initially allowed the claims to proceed finding it had subject matter
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jurisdiction under the ATS and TVPA, it eventually dismissed the transnational claims on FNC
grounds.
In Aldana, the court of appeals upheld the district court’s FNC dismissal again making the
distinction spearheaded in Piper that a foreign plaintiff is afforded less deference in forum
choice.185 In the adequacy analysis, rather than delve into whether Guatemalan courts had
substantive laws and procedural rules sufficient to adjudicate the claims, the U.S. courts concluded
adequacy by the fact that the host state had jurisdiction over all the parties and that the plaintiffs
had no reason to fear for their safety as they would not have to appear in a Guatemalan court. 186
This result again evidences the focus U.S. courts place upon a host state’s sovereignty.
The public interest factors discussed in Aldana illustrate the courts’ repeated deferential tone. The
appeals court affirmed the district court’s assertion that the dispute was ‘quintessentially
Guatemalan’ since it involved one of the country’s largest employers, even though the MNC was
headquartered in the U.S. Comity considerations were also forefront when the appeals court
asserted that were it to retain jurisdiction it would send the tacit message that the “Guatemalan
judicial system is too corrupt to justly resolve the dispute.”187 And even though the Aldana appeals
court decision upheld the FNC dismissal, it accepted that corruption and other deficiencies in the
Guatemalan system were facts “at war with the [lower court’s] undisputed finding that Guatemalan
courts constitute an adequate alternative forum.”188
In Canada, the FNC doctrine has also been used to bring an effective end to litigation—at least for
the purposes of a liability determination against Canadian MNCs. One such example is the Quebec
Superior Court’s decision in Cambior, a claim brought on behalf of Guyanese citizens against a
Canadian mining company following a cyanide spill that resulted in water contamination.189 Like
its American counterparts, the court in Cambior ignored what it characterized as ‘scathing’
evidence that Guyana’s judicial system “was nothing more than an appendage of the repressive
administrative dictatorship it served.”190
Similar to the U.S. approach that prioritizes comity considerations over the home state’s national
interest in adjudicating a transnational dispute, the Court in Cambior deferred to the Guyanese
legal system by accepting evidence that it was adequate even though “there is room for substantial
improvement.”191 Soon after a Guyanese claim was commenced, it was dismissed on ‘procedural
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grounds’ with the only available information online being a press release on Cambior’s website
saying the claim was struck for “repeated failure to file an affidavit by the plaintiffs.”192
ii. Act of State
In transnational disputes, act of state is one out of a number of prudential common law doctrines
whereby a court decides that overseas conduct is so closely tied to a foreign government that a
defendant—public or private—cannot be liable for an alleged wrong.193 Although its application
overlaps among states, in U.S. jurisprudence the doctrine is a defence on the merits whereas in the
U.K. it is one of abstention in which British courts deny jurisdiction.194 Irrespective of that
distinction, it has been an obstacle Global South plaintiffs face when they try to procure
compensatory remedies from MNCs pursuant to human rights violations.
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court laid out the test to dismiss a case on act of state grounds. A court
must assess whether i) there was an official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own
territory; and ii) the relief sought or the defence interposed would require a court to declare the
official act invalid. According to the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick, “[a]ct of state issues only arise
when a court must decide—that is, when the outcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official
action by a foreign sovereign.”195 According to the Sabbatino Court, if those two elements are
inconclusive on whether to dismiss a case on act of state grounds, courts are to undertake a threefactor balancing test to determine the doctrine’s application. The three factors are whether: i) there
is a high degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law; ii)
the foreign relations implications are high; and iii) the government that perpetrated the challenged
act of state is no longer in existence.196
In the U.S., the doctrine has been successfully invoked to dismiss transnational human rights cases
against MNCs. District and appeals courts in California applied the Sabbatino factors in a series
of decisions concerning alleged acts of torture, forced labour, and confiscation of property by the
sitting Burmese government (State Law and Order Restoration Council or “SLORC”) against local
villagers in the course of oil extraction activities by Unocal Corporation. The prospect for an act
of state defense arose due to the fact that Unocal entered into a joint venture with the Burmese
military to construct an oil pipeline. In one of the decisions, Roe v. Unocal Corp., the defendant
MNC brought a motion to dismiss on the basis that adjudicating the plaintiff’s claims would
require the district court to “pass judgment on the validity of SLORC’s official military acts.”197
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Proceeding through the Sabbatino test, the court in Roe v. Unocal Corp. determined that SLORC
was, in fact, the legitimate Burmese government and thus constituted a foreign sovereign. It also
concluded that an order to undertake public works (such as those related to building a pipeline for
oil extraction) constitutes an official military act. Concerning the balancing factors, the court held
that requiring the plaintiff, a Burmese military officer, to work on a civil construction project
without pay does not constitute a violation of international law. Therefore, there was insufficient
codification or consensus to set aside the doctrine’s application. Also, the plaintiff’s claims would
“most likely touch national nerves”198 indicating high implications for foreign relations. Lastly,
there was nothing to suggest that SLORC was no longer in existence. The act of state doctrine thus
served as a merits-based rule of decision to dismiss the transnational case, leaving the foreign
plaintiff no further avenue in the U.S. to seek a compensatory remedy.
III.

Weaponizing Activism: Three Principled Bases in Transnational Business and
Human Rights Litigation

In light of the legislative and judicial gaps presented in the previous part, Global South host state
plaintiffs are left with a stark reality. In theory, they can approach their own courts, but would be
confronted with political pressure and judicial systems that have rarely, if ever, adjudicated
transnational corporate tort claims against MNCs headquartered in western states.199 Furthermore,
the vast majority of MNC assets that could satisfy a judgment are held outside host states where
human rights and environmental harms take place and where a private law claim would be
commenced in a domestic court.200 Without the ability to lobby the political branches of
government in home states to ameliorate statutory laws in their favour, Global South victims have
persisted in their attempts to advance novel theories of jurisdiction and liability in western common
law courts.
If the law around transnational corporate liability for human rights harms is going to allow host
state victims from the Global South a consistent avenue to hold MNCs accountable, home state
judiciaries will have to act sua sponte to forge a restitutionary pathway. This part provides three
bases by which home state judiciaries can turn course from the restraint and deference taken in the
past. First, common law judges can heed Franck’s argument that foreign relations concerns are, in
fact, a relic of the colonial past and that there is a marked distinction between foreign policy and
judicial policy. Second, judges can view themselves as appropriate conduits to fill prevailing
transnational access to justice gaps. Third, judges may choose to see transnational business and
human rights litigation as an appropriate area to incorporate what legal philosophers have
characterized as permissible judicial morality.
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It is arguably easier for a handful of judges to veer in a different doctrinal direction than it is for a
majority faction of legislatures from various political parties to pass legislation that would allow
foreign plaintiffs with no voting power to sue western-headquartered MNCs in home state courts.
As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78, courts, compared to the other branches of
government, are “the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady,
upright and impartial administration of the laws.”201 In his 18th treatise, Blackstone wrote that
judges are “depositary of the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and
who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land.”202 Perhaps in no area can
that quote be more applicable today than in transnational business and human rights litigation that
is marred by legality gaps that beckon for judges to fulfill their roles as ‘living oracles’ once again.
The political branches of government function with relatively short electoral timelines and are
subject to the whims of corporate lobbying power. Judiciaries exist at an arms-length from any of
the litigants that appear before them. Therefore, there are ostensibly little, if any, political or
economic interests at play for home state judiciaries when it comes to the state of the common law
around transnational corporate human rights disputes. In all, judge-made law appears to be the
‘low hanging fruit’ in the pursuit of MNC accountability for human rights and environmental
harms in the Global South.
Once in their posts, common law judges are politically independent and not beholden to corporate
lobbying power like the elected branches of government. Judiciaries, particularly in common law
jurisdictions, are able to advance the law incrementally—especially in light of the dearth of legal
principles that apply to transnational corporate tort claims today for human rights and
environmental violations in the Global South. And simply because judiciaries have been reticent
in the past to assert jurisdiction or advance principles around transnational corporate tort liability
does not mean they necessarily need to take the same tack in the future.
The three methods to judicialize transnational business and human rights litigation, noted above,
are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they overlap with one another in some respects. For instance,
judges may view their ability to fill transnational access to justice gaps or the ability to adjudicate
matters that abut foreign relations as part of judicial morality. The overall point is that there are
doctrinal and philosophical bases to expand the adjudicative role such that transnational business
and human rights litigation can overcome long-standing hurdles and potentially allow for Global
South host state victims to more frequently recover compensatory remedies for powerful MNCs.
a. Heeding Franck: Judicial Policy vs. Foreign Policy
Both lawyers representing MNCs in home state transnational business and human rights claims as
well as home state governments that have intervened in select cases have asserted a peculiar
argument—the adjudication of such claims by home state courts interferes with foreign relations.
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Above, I outlined arguments made in the context of the act of state doctrine as well as Posner and
Sunstein’s position around ‘Chevronizing’ foreign relations. In addition to those examples, there
have been instances in transnational business and human rights disputes in which defendants or
intervenors have argued that litigation impinges on foreign policy. For instance, interventions by
the Department of State during George W. Bush’s tenure as president raised foreign relations
concerns.203
In Rio Tinto, the department submitted a letter to the Central District of California stating that
“continued adjudication of the claims … would risk a potentially serious impact … on the conduct
of our foreign relations.”204 Similarly, in Doe v. Unocal, the Department of Justice argued “the
ATS…raises significant potential for serious interference with the important foreign policy interest
of the United States.”205 There, the Bush administration not only opposed ATS arguments in that
particular case, but opposed the entire line of ATS human rights cases commenced until then. The
government argued that “the ATS has been wrongly interpreted to permit suits requiring the courts
to pass factual, moral and legal judgment on … foreign acts.”206 Otherwise, in Re South African
Apartheid Litigation, the U.S. government as well the governments of the U.K., Canada, South
Africa, Germany, and Switzerland submitted briefs arguing against the ability of U.S. courts to
assert ATS jurisdiction over MNCs for transnational human rights violations. In its brief, the Bush
administration argued that the suit would harm its economic interests abroad in addition to
attenuating its relations with foreign governments.207
Should home state judiciaries treat transnational business and human rights cases as non-justiciable
because host state commerce overlaps with concerns about a nation’s foreign policy? A logical
place to start in order to answer that question is to understand how foreign relations and the law
around it have been characterized. Definitions of foreign relations law emphasize that it sits at the
intersection of domestic laws and international law or international affairs. Bradley defines it as
the “[d]omestic law of each nation that governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the
world.”208 For him, the topic concerns a domestic judiciary’s authority in cases that relate to
international affairs. Similarly, Aust and Kleinlein view foreign relations law as bridging domestic
and international laws or, otherwise, setting boundaries between the two.209
The above definitions are crafted in a broad enough manner such that any relation or overlap of
domestic law with international affairs can fall within the realm of foreign relations law and, at
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one time or another, can be a basis for a domestic court to take a restrained approach to jurisdiction
in a given case. However, there are justifiable bases in transnational business and human rights
cases to keep the two realms (i.e. domestic and international) separate. The primary basis may be
what Franck has suggested—judicial policy does not constitute foreign policy. The idea that a
judge or panel of judges adjudicating the private law rights of former employees or third party
community members affected by an MNC’s conduct or policies in a host state in the course of,
typically, extractive or manufacturing activities naturally impinges on a country’s foreign relations
seemingly aggrandizes a domestic court’s actual role.
Individual judges or judicial panels are tasked with applying the law to a set of a facts in a single
case. One jurisdictional or merits-based judicial decision does not constitute a country’s foreign
policy. However, it constitutes precedential doctrine that persists within a judicial system over
time. Moreover, as Jinks and Katyal have noted, we need not be so naïve as to think judges play
such a seminal role in foreign relations that their opinions in one case will attenuate relations
between a set of states.210 Judicial decisions, lest we forget, are subject to legislative and executive
overhauls across the common law world. Yet, to date, in the common law home states analyzed in
the previous part there is no explicit indication of legislative intent that would serve as a basis to
bar home state courts from adjudicating over transnational business and human rights litigation.
Richard Falk pointed out decades ago that there is an apparent conflict of interest between the
judiciary and the executive in matters of international politics. The executive is focused on
conciliatory settlement to maintain good relations among states. The judiciary is rights-focused,
interested in the resolution of a particular claim before the court.211 In other words, common law
judiciaries ought to be primarily concerned with the litigants before them that have an interest in
resolving a private law-based dispute in accordance with established or potential doctrine.
Adjudication by domestic judiciaries may have a broader public interest role, including (likely
tangential) consequences on how an MNC or home state government interacts with a host state
government and/or its population. However, as opponents of judicial activism themselves note,
judiciaries are neither tasked with nor have expertise in broader public policy or international
affairs. That a decision on a singular dispute based on a specific fact pattern will have ripple effects
on a country’s foreign relations is presumptuous. It elicits an unwarranted anxiety that a decision
to assert jurisdiction or impute liability on an MNC for extraterritorial conduct will attenuate
relations between two nations and potentially weaken one or both countries’ political and/or
economic fortunes.
Anxiety around foreign relations becomes more presumptuous if we factor in that the home states
routinely involved in transnational business and human rights litigation (i.e. the U.S., U.K.,
Canada, the Netherlands, France) are relatively powerful countries with long-standing and
entrenched relations with Global South host states where MNCs headquartered on their territories
operate. A domestic judiciary adjudicating a case around the private rights of a single or group of
host state plaintiffs will not and likely cannot upend those established realities. Rather, as has
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recently been the case, it is government action that tends to weaken foreign relations. Iran’s nuclear
program, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s human rights violations against its Uighur
minority, and Saudi Arabia’s role in the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi have been the source
of recent foreign relations anxieties.
Moreover, instances of MNC-related litigation that overlaps with foreign relations has been about
an MNC headquartered in a different country from the adjudicating court rather being
headquartered in the same territory. One example is the arrest and extradition hearings of Huawei
executive Meng Wanghou in Canada. There is greater normative authority for a court to adjudicate
a claim that concerns a corporate party headquartered within the same sovereign territory.
Arguably, a foreign government—particularly one like China’s with significant extraterritorial
commercial interests—would be perturbed about another country’s courts adjudicating a claim
against one of its largest corporate actors. However, a home state court in the U.S. or Canada, for
instance, that hears a private law claim around the conduct of an MNC headquartered on its
territory is well within its adjudicative jurisdiction.
On a different note, opponents of judicial activism argue that a nation is no longer speaking with
one voice (i.e. the president’s or the executive’s) when a court decides to assert jurisdiction or
impute liability on an MNC headquartered on its territory. That claim is unfounded. For one,
although judges may be able to curtail corporate behaviour (and even that is suspect), they are not
positioned to alter government behaviour with respect to relations with foreign governments. A
liability finding against an MNC does not bar the executive branches of home and host state
governments from freely interacting with each other in much the same way as before such a
finding. In short, the separation of powers not only renders judiciaries independent of the
executive, but likewise renders the executive independent of the judiciary.
Furthermore, MNC liability does not bar a host state government from encouraging and facilitating
foreign investment. It may require MNCs to pay host state employees better wages with fewer
hours and with safer working conditions; or it may require MNCs to remediate a plot of land or to
maintain better oversight of contracted officials or militias so they no longer harm or even kill host
state inhabitants. In such instances, private law affects corporate behaviour and, as such, should
not be scapegoated for attenuating foreign relations.
b. Filling Transnational Access to Justice Gaps
Falk characterized adjudication as a form of participation. Among other things, participation in the
adjudicative process ought to afford parties with the opportunity to present reasoned arguments
before a neutral adjudicator pursuant to an alleged breach of a right.212 Unfortunately, pursuant to
the legislative and judicial gaps, presented above, coupled with ongoing problems in host state
legal systems, a transnational access to justice gap has developed for plaintiffs who have
experienced personal or environmental harms on the part of MNCs headquartered in common law
states.
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Contrary to the Third Pillar of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, existing access to justice gap in transnational business and human rights litigation means
there is no viable judicial avenue for host state victims, largely from the Global South, to pursue
private law claims. As discussed above, there has been some progress in the U.K. and Canada
pursuant to the Supreme Courts of those home states rejecting early-stage dismissal motions based
on corporate veil and customary international law grounds. Nevertheless, lawyers representing
host state plaintiffs in transnational business and human rights litigation are typically fighting an
uphill battle in light of the existing vacuum of legality.
In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Benjamin Cardozo wrote that “[t]he rules and principles of
case law have never been treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested in
those great laboratories of the law, the courts of justice.”213 He argued that one function of the
courts was to fill gaps in the law “which are found in every positive law in greater or less
measure.”214 That scenario now confronts common law judges in home states. For Mendelson,
judicial activism was particularly warranted in a democratic society “when other political forces
have abdicated their role of directing social change.215 In the midst of legality gaps then, judges
not only have the ability but a duty to advance the common law in a way that allows for
transnational corporate human rights claims to be heard on their merits.
A number of doctrines can be addressed when we speak about common law judiciaries filling
transnational access to justice gaps. I focus on two areas here. First, given the failure of Congress
to amend the ATS as well as the evolving nature of transnational violations, U.S. federal courts
may consider reading in additional violations into the ATS’s singular provision. In Doe v. Nestle,
Justice Sotomayor argued for this approach. Otherwise, at least when it comes to tort liability that
can directly compensate host state victims, U.S.-based MNCs will be given a carte blanche with
respect to how they operate in Global South host states. Second, related to FNC dismissals,
common law courts can retain, to a greater extent, jurisdiction in transnational business and human
rights litigation so host state plaintiffs no longer have to litigate a case from start to finish in a host
state court only to learn that a host state court’s judgment cannot be enforced in a home state. Also,
home state courts can better align FNC and foreign judgment enforcement analyses
As a preliminary remark on this section, for those who may critique the notion that a judiciary
cannot sua sponte advance principles of corporate liability to fill access to justice gaps should
consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1909 unanimous decision in New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad Co. v. United States. There, the Court acknowledged that the changing nature of society
demanded that corporations, just like natural persons, be held criminally liable for illegal
conduct.216 By construing corporate criminal liability in the absence of legislative guidance, the
Court rejected the notion that a corporate entity could not commit a crime. The Court’s own words
are worth reproducing as they constitute precisely the type of acknowledgement missing on the
part of home state judiciaries in transnational business and human rights litigation:
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We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation,
which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be
held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has
entrusted authority to act in the subject matter of making and fixing rates of transportation,
and whose knowledge and purposes may well be attributed to the corporation for which
the agents act. While the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of
corporations no less than to those of individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the
great majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted through these bodies,
and particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands, and to give them
immunity from all punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation
cannot commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling
the subject matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.217
i. Expanding the ‘Law of Nations’
Since the ATS’s post-Filartiga invigoration, a debate has persisted around the requirement that a
defendant must violate the ‘Law of Nations’. Should that term be interpreted in a way that honours
what the ‘law of nations’ meant when the statute was enacted in 1789 or what the law of nations
encompasses today? Most recently, this debate arose in the 2021 decision of Doe v. Nestle, a string
of plurality opinions that freezes the ‘law of nations’ to its 18th century understanding.
The potential role for judicial activism comes out of a discussion in Nestle around which branch
of government rightfully can expand the violations that fall within the ATS’s ‘law of nations’
requirement. Justice Thomas (joined by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanagh) deemed that role to be
almost uniquely a legislative task. Conversely, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Breyer and
Kagan) did not see that role in ATS disputes to be beyond the judiciary’s ability.218 In his plurality
opinion, Justice Thomas immediately took a deferential stance, stating upfront that “[w]e cannot
create a cause of action that would let them [the plaintiffs / respondents] sue petitioners. That job
belongs to Congress, not the Federal Judiciary.”219
The language that Thomas uses to support deference to Congress is jarring and something that
Justice Sotomayor in her own plurality opinion likewise notices. Thomas asserts that the Court is
prohibited from creating a new cause of action under the ATS and “must refrain from creating a
cause of action [i.e. a new violation under the ‘law of nations’] whenever there is even a single
sound reason to defer to Congress.”220 For that proposition, he cites the Court’s 2020 decision in
Hernandez v. Mesa, which actually did not resort to the “single sound reason” language, even in
Justice Thomas’s own concurring opinion in that case.221
As Thomas and other conservative justices had done before, in Nestle he limits the ATS’s ambit
to the three international law tort violations the statute initially encompassed: violation of safe
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conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.222 He asserted that “[a]liens
harmed by a violation of international law must rely on legislative and executive remedies, not
judicial remedies.”223 His primary concern with judicial remedies seems to accord with Posner and
Sunstein and something that Franck argued against—“[t]he Judiciary does not have the
‘institutional capacity’ to consider all factors relevant to creating a cause of action that will
inherently affect foreign policy.”224
Thomas indicates, like the Court did in Hernandez, that the federal judiciary should avoid
“upsetting the careful balance of interests struck by the lawmakers.”225 For him, a judicial
expansion of the ATS would amount to second-guessing Congress, a point Justice Sotomayor
explains with historical evidence is, in fact, contrary to the intentions of the First Congress.
Moreover, as discussed, the concern with Thomas’s deferential stance is that the political branches
of government in the U.S. and other common law home states have been unwilling to legislate
private law remedies for transnational corporate human rights violations.
To be fair, Thomas’s opinion does not completely rule out the prospect for judicial discretion to
widen the ATS’s scope, but places that discretion at such a high threshold that if it was not
exercised in a well-documented case of child slavery, as Nestlé was, it is difficult to see where that
discretion would apply. He views judicial discretion to be “an extraordinary act that places great
stress on the separation of powers.”226 That approach is markedly distinct from that of Cardozo
and others who saw it well within the judiciary’s purview to fill gaps in the law in the face of
reticence by the political branches.
In her plurality opinion, Justice Sotomayor argued that Justice Thomas’s views around the role of
the judiciary to create new causes of action under the ATS are, in fact, unmoored from the ATS’s
history as well as from the world that surrounds us.227 She begins her opinion with the critique that
likely stands out to many who read Justice Thomas’s words: the world has changed in the last two
centuries. She writes, “[l]ike the pirates of the 18th century, today’s torturers, slave traders, and
perpetrators of genocide are hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”228 That
understanding alone may be the most robust basis for judiciaries to sua sponte fill gaps in the law
around transnational business and human rights litigation. Courts ought to update doctrine in
accordance with the realities of the world around them, and especially when the political branches
have failed to enact new laws to align doctrine with the vicissitudes of globalization.
MNCs have skillfully used now outdated doctrines to avoid the prospect of redistributing their
revenues to Global South host state victims pursuant to human rights and environmental harms.
What is required is not only the wisdom, but the courage of the 1909 U.S. Supreme Court that did
not view reining in powerful corporate actors as beyond its adjudicative powers. Of course, with
the current conservative super-majority on the U.S. Supreme Court that increasingly appears to be
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curtailing rather than expanding rights (for U.S. citizens let alone foreign plaintiffs), it is unlikely
in the near future that any majority of the Court will be inclined to read in further violations into
the ATS’s ‘law of nations’ requirement.
With that said, when there are a sufficient number of justices who take Justice Sotoamyor’s view
in Nestle that the ATS can be expanded without legislative intervention, it should be at the forefront
of the Court’s collective mind that expanding the scope of the ‘law of nations’—extraterritoriality
considerations aside—is one of the easiest and most expedient ways to effect transnational
corporate tort liability. With Congress likely to be divided on any legislative action to overhaul a
future judicial decision that expands the ATS’s scope, it is a reasonable assumption that a
judicially-instigated expansion would remain in place for the foreseeable future and bind lower
court judges in subsequent transnational claims commenced in the U.S.
ii. FNC / Foreign Judgment Enforcement
The second doctrinal area that elicits a potential for common law home state courts to fill
transnational access to justice gaps is what Christopher Whytock and Cassandra Robertson
characterize as an ex ante / ex post flip around FNC dismissals and foreign judgment enforcement,
otherwise referred to as ‘boomerang litigation.’229 To elaborate, in the rare instance in which an
FNC dismissal in a home state court subsequently results in a host state judgment against an MNC,
foreign plaintiffs have had to return to the home state to enforce that judgment because MNC
defendants have been unwilling to accept a host state court’s decision. Moreover, MNCs retain
assets primarily where they are headquartered.230 Common law home states courts, particularly in
the U.S., have applied the FNC doctrine in transnational corporate human rights claims leniently
ex ante and then taken a stricter approach at the recognition and enforcement stage.
An example of this ex ante / ex post flip is the dibromochloropropane litigation against Dow, Shell,
Dole Foods, and a number of other American MNCs on behalf of thousands of banana farm
workers in Latin American host states who became sterile, despite the chemical previously being
banned in the U.S.231 In Delgado, a district court in Texas dismissed consolidated claims on FNC
grounds holding the cases would be better litigated in Latin America, the Philippines, the Ivory
Coast, and Burkino Faso. As an indication the court in Delgado prioritized the ‘convenience to the
parties’ and ‘local interest’ elements of the FNC analysis devised by the Supreme Court in Gilbert,
it presented an analysis of the adequacy of 12 different host state legal systems in a mere eight
pages. Explicitly, the Court’s adequacy analysis was woefully deficient.232 Moreover, the Court
only needed one paragraph to address whether a host state judgment would be enforceable in a
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U.S. court. It surmised that judgment enforceability would not be a concern given that the MNC
defendants expressed a willingness to satisfy a host state judgment.233
After the FNC dismissal in the U.S., some of the plaintiffs were able to obtain a $489.4 million
USD judgment against Shell in Nicaragua—one of the host states that received a superficial
adequacy analysis in the FNC dismissal in Delgado. After the Nicaraguan judgment, Shell filed a
complaint in the Central District of California requesting a declaration that the foreign judgment
was unenforceable as it was “rendered under a system that does not provide impartial tribunals.”234
The plaintiffs, now the defendants in the enforcement action, argued that Shell had changed its
position from the FNC motion in Delgado. They argued that if the court denied enforcement, there
would be “no place on this earth where an individual poisoned by DBCP may have his or her day
in court.”235 Rather than defer to the host state court’s jurisdiction as the court did in Delgado, the
enforcing court accepted the MNC’s argument that it was, in fact, not subject to a Nicaraguan
court’s personal jurisdiction—even though accepting host state jurisdiction was a condition of the
FNC dismissal in the first place. Consequently, the foreign judgment was deemed unenforceable.236
Another instance of the ex ante / ex post flip revolved around Chevron / Texaco’s environmental
harms in Ecuador, mentioned above. After FNC dismissals in the U.S., the plaintiffs ultimately
obtained a $9.5 billion USD judgment through the Ecuadorian courts against the parent company
of Chevron’s global conglomerate. The plaintiffs first attempted to enforce the judgment in the
U.S. where the parent company has assets. In a full bench trial that resulted in an almost 400-page
decision, Kaplan J. of the Southern District of New York ruled that the Ecuadorian judgment was
procured through fraud and corruption—a conclusion that corroborates Tarek Hansen and
Whytock’s assertion that when FNC dismissals neglect the likelihood of enforcement, plaintiffs
are left without a meaningful remedy.237
Rather than accept the foreign judgment at face value and, in effect, give the Ecuadorian courts
the same deference it had in the FNC proceedings, the district court concluded that lawyers for the
plaintiff had fabricated evidence, made bribes, and ghost-written documents. Kaplan J. forcefully
wrote, “[i]f ever there were a case warranting equitable relief with respect to a judgment procured
by fraud, this is it.”238 That decision barred enforcement anywhere in the U.S. and was upheld on
appeal with certiorari denied by the Supreme Court.239
Like judicial reticence to expand the list of violations that fall within the ATS’s ‘law of nations’
requirement, common law home state courts can choose to take a different approach to the current
ex ante / ex post flip in transnational business and human rights litigation to avoid systemic
transnational access to justice gaps that have left Global South host state victims without a viable
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judicial avenue to seek and recover compensation from MNCs. There are two ways that home state
judiciaries can become more activism in this regard.
First, home state courts can assume less deference to a host state’s legal system, which elicits an
unfounded paternalism that dictates to a host state that it ought to adjudicate the transnational claim
in place of a home state court. That was the precise tack taken in Bhopal that ultimately sank any
chance the Indian victims had of recovering a substantial sum of money from Union Carbide.
Home state courts in Delgado, Bhopal, and in other instances have been too superficial in their
analysis of the adequacy of the host state court in question to adjudicate the complex transnational
tort claim at hand. Greater due diligence at the FNC dismissal stage would keep more transnational
cases in home state courts, which could eventually lead to a liability finding against an MNC for
extraterritorial human rights or environmental harms.
The second way that home state courts can overcome the ex ante / ex post flip is to honour the
decision of the FNC dismissing court that a host state court is sufficiently adequate to adjudicate
the transnational claim and that any judgment rendered by a host state court—subject to glaring
signs of corruption or other deficiencies in how host state proceedings took place—will be
recognized and enforced by the home state. In line with academic conceptions of judicial activism,
this view of foreign judgment enforcement may already have the result in mind. By being more
lenient at the enforcement stage, home state judiciaries are expressing that host state plaintiffs
ought to be afforded a remedy that they would not be otherwise able to secure from an MNC
defendant.
As mentioned above, an MNC’s retained assets are unlikely to be held in a host state subsidiary.
Couple that with a home state court’s unwillingness to enforce a host state judgment and host state
plaintiffs are effectively barred from a private law remedy. John Locke famously wrote that “he
who hath received any damage has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other
men, a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it.”240 A right that cannot be
enforced to render a remedy is arguably no right at all. Global South host state plaintiffs who can
neither have their claims adequately adjudicated by their own courts nor enforced by a home state
court are consequently subjected to a law-free zone of impunity in which MNCs can commit
human rights and environmental harms without the possibility for compensatory redress.

c. A Contemporary Space for Judicial Morality
Above, I presented two methods by which home state judiciaries may be inclined to take more
activist stances in contemporary transnational business and human rights litigation. They can heed
Franck’s notion that judicial policy is distinct from foreign policy. Otherwise, they can fill
transnational access to justice gaps by expanding the ‘law of lations’ in the ATS or by mitigating
what has become an ex ante / ex post flip with regards to FNC dismissals and foreign judgment
enforcement. In this section, I present a third potential basis for activism to take hold in home state
courts: the implementation of judicial morality via a rights-based conception of the rule of law.
240
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Legal philosophers have previously debated the place of extra-doctrinal judicial morality in
resolving disputes in state-sanctioned courts. Inevitably, this debate touches on some fundamental
concepts, including how we define law itself as well as what constitutes the rule of law. Generally,
legal positivists lie on one end of that debate. Joseph Raz identifies two theses that encompass the
positivist conception.241 The ‘sources thesis’ requires that all law have an identifiable source. He
defines it as the following: “[a] law is source-based if its existence and content can be identified
by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative argument.”242 In other words, a
positive legal rule and a fact pattern suffice to decide a dispute before a neutral adjudicator. This
is Raz’s preferred thesis. He critiques the other two theses that he calls the ‘incorporation thesis’
and the ‘coherence thesis’. The incorporation thesis, prominently supported by H.L.A. Hart, is that
“all law is either sourced-based or entailed by source-based law.”243 In essence, the incorporation
thesis, albeit slightly broader than the sources thesis, still comes within the realm of legal
positivism.
Defended in recent times by Ronald Dworkin, the coherence thesis opposes positivistic views of
the rule of law. It asserts that “law consists of source-based law together with the morally soundest
justification of sourced-based law.”244 The coherence thesis illuminates the divide around how
judges should decide ‘hard cases’ like transnational business and human rights litigation cases that
typically have novel fact patterns, ambiguous statutory frameworks, or unstable doctrinal
referents.245
For Dworkin, the rule of law can manifest either via a ‘rule book conception’ (akin to Raz’s sources
or incorporation theses) or a ‘rights-based conception.’ Under the rule book conception, judges
only interpret and apply legislation as intended and enacted by elected branches of government.246
Relatedly, judges will be reticent to advance the common law and opt to await legislative guidance.
In matters of statutory interpretation, the rule book conception manifests via i) semantic theories,
ii) group-psychological theories that inquire into what legislators intended when they devised a
particular rule, or iii) historical theories that suggest what legislators would have enacted if they
were tasked with legislating the exact issue that appears before a judge in a hard case. 247 For
Dworkin, the rule book conception seeks to rectify the rule book so that “the collection of sentences
is improved so as more faithfully to record the will of the various institutions whose decisions put
those sentences in the rule book.”248
The primary justification for the rule book conception is ‘the argument from democracy,’ which
asserts that elected branches of government (as opposed to an appointed judiciary) represent the
will of the populous. That will should not be overridden by a small group of legal elites who
241
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substitute their morality in place of the public’s collective morality that translates into positive
legislated rules.249 Of course, this idea may be subject to challenge as of late on the basis that
electoral politics may, at times, render the will of the public somewhat distinct from how elected
branches of government are actually constituted. In three of the last five federal elections, the
nominee that has garnered fewer votes nationally has won the election on the basis that he won
more electoral college seats.
On the other hand, pursuant to a rights-based conception legal persons have moral rights and duties
with respect to one another (as well as rights against the state) that may not be captured by the rule
book.250 Upon demand, moral rights can be enforced by judicial institutions erected by the state.
Dyzenhaus writes that “[t]he role of judges in Dworkin’s conception is reduced to that of
transmitting the content of the moral law. … [T]hey have to decide what interpretation of the
positive law relevant to the matter shows the law in its best moral light.”251 The ultimate question
the rights conception asks is whether the plaintiff has a moral right that ought to be enforced in
court. As such, it takes Locke’s above principle seriously to oblige a legal remedy to a moral right
irrespective of whether the rule book has anything explicit to say about either of them.252
The two distinct conceptions divide whether judges should make what Dworkin calls ‘political
decisions’ in hard cases, meaning whether they should elicit a principle other than what is explicitly
allowed for or entailed by the rule book. For Dworkin, although the rule book is not the exclusive
source of rights, a moral right must be consistent with the rule book. To substantiate that assertion,
he gives a radical example he calls the ‘Christian principle’, which would not fall within his rights
conception of the rule of law. Under the Christian principle, a judge in a compensatory claim could
deny a damages award against an indigent defendant on the basis that the relatively more solvent
plaintiff in the dispute should forego the claim as a sort of alms-giving. Although the Christian
principle may adhere to a judge’s underlying morality, for Dworkin it contravenes “the vast bulk
of the rules in the rulebook” and, as such, would not be a viable political decision by a judge under
the rights conception.253
Debated at a relatively more philosophical level, there is little explication in the rights-based and
rule book conceptions of any specific considerations around foreign plaintiffs. With that said,
Dworkin recognizes that the rights conception he supports favours what he calls ‘entrenched
minorities.’ He writes, “since, all else equal, the rich have more power over the legislature than
the poor, at least in the long run, transferring some decision from the legislature [to the judiciary]
may for that reason be more valuable to the poor.”254 Implicitly acknowledging the argument from
democracy, Dworkin posits that the majoritarian bias of legislatures works against entrenched
minorities whose rights are ignored by elected branches of government—an assertion that accords
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with the lack of legislatively-mandate tort remedies for foreign plaintiffs who allege harm on the
part of MNCs that predominantly operate in Global South host states.255
Foreign plaintiffs from the Global South neither have the power of the vote nor the power of the
purse in home states where their private law claims have been and will likely continue to be
adjudicated in the future. These plaintiffs are not practically capable of influencing the legislative
process in the way that corporate lobbying groups, for instance, opposed the ATSRA (and will
likely oppose the ATSCA). On that basis, home state judges may be inclined to insert a level of
morality to conclude that host state plaintiffs ought to be afforded a judicial avenue to
compensatory remedies. Of course, a determination to implement judicial morality is intertwined
with a recognition that there continue to exist transnational access to justice gaps, both within
existing statutory regimes and common law doctrines, including doctrines that overlap with foreign
policy considerations. Therefore, morality considerations are not divorced from the other two
principled bases for judicial activism that have been presented here.
Penned by now retired justice Rosalie Abella, the Supreme Court of Canada’s majority decision
in Nevsun illustrates how judicial morality can take hold in transnational business and human rights
litigation. As discussed above, one of the issues in Nevsun was whether the Eritrean plaintiffs
would be able to seek tort remedies pursuant to jus cogens human rights violations long recognized
under international law. Justice Abella affirmed the Court’s approach in a prior case entitled
Kazemi that a jus cogens norm “is a fundamental tenet of international law that is nonderogable.”256 In Nevsun, the issue before the Court was not necessarily the absence of any tort
cause of action but whether the Court ought to, in effect, recognize the particularly egregious
nature of the MNC defendant’s acts.
Abella first affirmed that the human rights violations alleged by the Nevsun plaintiffs fell within
the sphere of jus cogens norms. She then wrote that the “[d]evelopment of the common law occurs
where such developments are necessary to clarify a legal principle, to resolve an inconsistency, or
to keep the law aligned with the evolution of society. In my respectful view, recognizing the
possibility of a remedy for the breach of norms already forming part of the common law is such a
necessary development.”257 Only a few paragraphs later she explicitly cites the principle that a
“where there is a right, there must be a remedy for its violation.”258
How is Nevsun an instance of permissible judicial morality? The majority opinion recognized that,
at the time, there was no distinct cause of action that could lead to a remedy for violations of jus
cogens human rights norms as they are understood under international law. Moreover, the
Canadian parliament has not legislated a cause of action for violations of customary international
law. There is nothing in Canada akin to the ATS that ties together a potential tort claim to a
violation of the law of nations. Within that gap, the Nevsun majority found it appropriate to
advance the common law in a manner that could afford the foreign plaintiffs a potential remedy
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for the specific types of harm they alleged. Abella’s initial remark in her opinion substantiates that
notion:
…modern international human rights law [is] the phoenix that rose from the ashes of World
War II and declared global war on human rights abuses. Its mandate was to prevent
breaches of internationally accepted norms. Those norms were not meant to be theoretical
aspirations or legal luxuries, but moral imperatives and legal necessities. Conduct that
undermined the norms was to be identified and addressed [i.e. through legal remedies].259
Abella operationalized Dworkin’s rights-based conception of the rule of law without going outside
of the established rulebook. She first established that international law—specifically jus cogens
norms—forms part of Canadian common law and can thus be developed in a way that allows for
a private law remedy. Even in Abella’s conception of judicial morality, it was necessary for there
to be an established sourced-based and doctrinal framework within which she was working in order
to expand the common law in favour of host state plaintiffs who were suing a Canadianheadquartered MNC. In other words, she first established that it was within her adjudicative
capacity to advance the common law in line with international human rights rules and norms and
then did just that.
As a final point on judicial morality, Falk suggested a useful framework that can lead to home state
courts taking less deferential stances in favour of developing common law principles in matters
that concern grave human rights violations. He distinguishes between what he terms legitime and
illegitimate diversities. He writes:
In general, municipal courts should avoid interference in the domestic affairs of other states
when the subject matter of disputes illustrates a legitimate diversity of values on the part
of two national societies. In contrast, if the diversity can be said to be illegitimate, as when
it exhibits an abuse of universal human rights, then domestic courts fulfill their role by
refusing to further the policy of the foreign legal system. In instances of illegitimate
diversity, where a genuine universal sentiment exists, then domestic courts properly act as
agents of international order only if they give maximum effect to such universality.260
To apply Falk’s paradigm to transnational business and human rights litigation, consider that there
will be instances in which two legal systems can reasonably differ on a procedural or substantive
rule: the scope of discovery, the requirements to legally convey land, the rules of inheritance, the
elements appropriate to make out a cause of action, and many others. Those instances, where courts
can reasonably disagree, may warrant a lesser degree of activism or no activism at all such that
one court decides to defer to another court—in our case likely being a home state court deferring
to the jurisdiction of a host state court. Practically, this can occur in the course of FNC
determinations. However, cognizable universal harms, like the personal and environmental harms
often at issue in transnational business and human rights litigation, warrant a court to retain
jurisdiction irrespective of a foreign court’s interest in the matter.
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To be clear, in transnational business and human rights litigation, a home state court retaining
jurisdiction does not necessarily elicit a concern about the “policy of the foreign legal system” as
Falk’s quote states. Rather, it is an appreciation that there are particularly egregious harms at issue
in a given claim and that a host state court may not be best placed to adjudicate a claim related to
such harms. Home state courts ought to be willing to retain jurisdiction in light of established
incapacities in host state legal systems and previous instances in which deference on the part of
home state judiciaries has not afforded host state plaintiffs a viable avenue to compensatory
remedies. We saw this above with FNC dismissals and the circumstances around boomerang
litigation.
Falk gives the example of the Eichmann trial in which an Israeli court asserted universal
jurisdiction for Holocaust-related harms. In his view, Eichmann illustrated an illegitimate diversity
between Israel and a foreign state. Again, in transnational business and human rights litigation,
even if there is no explicit governmental or judicial policy that speaks contrary to universal human
rights. Rather, the concern with deferring jurisdiction to a host state court is that fundamental
human rights violations should not go unaddressed to the extent that a plaintiff cannot recover
compensation for egregious harm. Placing those fundamental rights above a host state court’s
jurisdiction to adjudicate a complex transnational claim (while not straying from the basic
principles of the rulebook) would be an appropriate instantiation of judicial morality in future
home state business and human rights litigation.

Conclusion
This article has explored what has become an opportunity for judges in common law home states
to fill the ‘governance gap’ for transnational human rights and environmental violations on the
part of MNCs headquartered in the western world. Given the inaction on the part of elected
branches of government to enact legislative reforms, judiciaries may be the only viable source of
private law remedies for Global South host state victims who have suffered egregious harms.
Judicial activism would not only fulfill the natural law maxim that ‘where there is a right there is
a remedy’, it would honour the third pillar of the U.N. Guiding Principles. Activism may not take
hold immediately or even in the near future—particularly with entrenched conservative wings in
the judiciaries of several common law home states. However, this article has presented some
potential pathways to actualize activism when individual judges or even a majority of judges on
appellate panels are prepared to imbibe a more expansive adjudicative role.
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